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1CHAPTER I
THE RESEARCH
OVERVIEW.
OB1ECTIVE AND tHEORETICAL
A. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
,
t
~
t
since 2 February 1990 I wide ranging events in South
Africa have heralded the poe sibili'ties of, a new
economic co-operation era across southern Afriba. On
that date, in South Africa, the then President F.W. de
l<l.3rkpaved che way for this new era by unbanning all
na jo'rpolitical opposition groups, re:lea~':'ngpolitical
prisoners and starting a process of transition to a
democratic South Africa.
These events have an important bearing on ~he economic
pattern ~n the region between South Africa and the
Southern African Development community (SADC). South
Africa, free of :.partheid and r.he dream of eoonomd c ,
military and political hegemony, has joined the SADC
since August 1994.
The acceptance of South Africa by its neighbours as a
partner in the effort to build a broader economic
community has become a central focus of economic and
intellectual debe: J in the SUb-continent.
While the new political dispensation in South Africa
is significant from the standpoint of peace and
development, it is not at a1l certain what precise
form the "post-apartheid" order will take in the
region, nor the possibilities it offers for the
reconstruction of regional economic co-opara+Lon , The
aim of this study is to identify and analyse factors
which are likely to operate aqaf.nst;or t.ofavour close
2economic co-operation and integration in soucharn
Africs$
The programme of action of the southern African
Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) (that of
decreasing regio,nal dependenoe on South Africa and
Western countries and fostering regional development)
was called an Il:i..mportantd unconventional regional
venture If (11 and t:ermed "revolutionary"(2). ~ These
descriptionc reflected the reaction of SADCC to two
things. FirstlYr to the integration approach followed
by earlier groupings on the continent and secondly, to
the environment into which it was called to operate;
characterised by dependency, underdevelopment a~d fear
of South Africa's economic domination and military
supremacy.
The specific problem to be investigated in this study
concerns the extent to which the SADe with South
Africa as a member is able to bring about regional
economic co-operation. This will be examined in the
light of tIle region's past political economy I
characterised by conflict, mistrust and isolation.
c. HYPOTHES:($.
The hypotinasLs to be examined is that: the rein-
corporation of South Africa into the SADe will, most
likely, lead to the promotion of policies to enhance
mutually beneficial economic relations betw€'enstates
in the region.
south. Africa's admission into the SADC will not,
however I of itsalf I automatically resolve the problems
created by the aout;e trade imbalances, inequalities
r
I
~.
f
!
3
and ectmonu.o domination that characte:rise existing
regional relations. To achieve its full significance I
South Africa' s adma.asion Lrrt.o the S.A.DCwill need ,to
reinforce procesaes (,)fnegotiations aimed at creating
a new equitable and mrt.ua Lky .beneficial regional order
iT' sout.hern Africa.
The creation of a flew economd.c framework will promote
regional Cl'J-operathm and inte9ration in the area and
will reinforce the SADC's economic and political
bargaining power in tHe changing 9lobal environment.
D. THEORETJCALAPRROACH AND DEFINITI9N ~$PECTS O~
~CONOMIC I~~RATION
It is possible to draw parallels between attempts at
economic co-operation in southern Africa and processes
of close economic co-operation elsewhere. ,in Africa I
such as the Eas)c African community (EAC) and the
Economi.cCommunityof West African States (ECOWAS).
But the backqr'ound to the SADCapproach makes it
different from the traditional type of regional co-
operation and integration on the continent.
The exchanqe relations in southern Africa cannot
sensibiy be discussed ~n terms differ,ent from those
applicable to the study of poli tical economy in
general, and of comparative situations in particular.
Thus, any study in this field should ccmsider with
extreme caution the viability of a structure of
economic relations emphasizing co-opera~ion or
integration in the region.
1. pefinition
The term "integration" shall occupy a central place in
4..;:1isstudy and it is th~refore important: to delimit
the meaning it is supposed to convey generally and
specially. Literally, integration means the bringing
together of parts into a whole. A).so ip-l-.egrationcan
be per '!eivGdas a process by which originally whole
and ind ..::pendentunfts are combined into a new unified
unit or system.
The word integration has a wide interdisciplinary
usage. It can refer to combination, union, fusion,
amulgamat~on, merger, absorption, unification,
centralisation, incorporation, synchronis&tion, co-
operation, marriage, league, alliance etcetera.(3)
2. Eqgpomic Definition of Integration
There is not yet a precise consensus as to the meaning
of the term economic integration. (4) Accor?-~ng to Bela
Bolussa economic integration is both a process and a
stage of affairs. As a process, it" encompasses
measures desi9ned to aboLi sh discrimination between
economic units belonging to different states; viewed
as a state of affairs, it can be represented by the
absence of various forms of discrimination between
national economics". (5)
Gunnar My~dal on the other hand,' states that a
regional economy is not integrated unless all avenues
are opened to everybody and the remunerations paid for
(the same) productive services are equal regardless of
racial, soc laL and cultural differences. (6) Another
theorist, Peter Robson, like Belassa defines
integration as:
".•.a situation that is normally
attained as a result of a process,
extending over time, during which
progressive adjustment are made with
the object of bringing about a state of
..
5affairs in which, within the group,
specialisation and exchange are
expanded" •1'11
Another scholar I
define regional
integration as
Hiroshi 1<itamura who atrt.empt.edto
integration saw the process of
involving nation-states which are
supposed to act in unison for the particular purpcses
of integration. This will definitely involve some, if
not total, loss of sovereignty to the ext.errcof t.he
form of economic integration i -Lved , (8) Ernest Haas
is more precise in this aspect of the definition and
sees regional integrati0n as "a study which is
concerned with explaining how and why states oease to
be wholly sovereign; how they voluntarily mingle,
merge and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the
factual attJ:'.ibutesof sovereignty while acquirin.9 new
techniques for resolving conflicts between
themsel ves II • (9)
Another theorist, Mytelka, provides a more general
definitio~ 0f regional economic integration which she
characterizes as "any system within which one can, at
a minimum, identify a distinctive and purposeful
pattern of common attitudes, mutual interactions
and/or collective decision-making activity". (10)
Brewster and Thomas suggest that it" is important in
trying to define integration to focus on the result
(consequences) than on the existence of integrating
mechanisms (process). (11)
B~t any attempt to find a more p~ecise definition will
have to distinguish between i:o.:t:eqratj..QD.and .90-
P~~Xfltion. In popular parlance, these two terms are
often used indiscriminately. In economic discussion,
however, co-operation comprises measures that include
the suppression of some forms of discrimination.
6Economic co-operation include various measures
d~signed to harmonise economic policies and to lessen
discrimination in economi,c relations between states.
These may
to joint
projects.
range from consultations on general policies
participation in specific programmes and
But they all stop short of creating
supranational political institutions or power centres
to where loyalties, expectations are shifted". But
economic integration refers to "a state'of affairs or
a process involving the combination of s~parate
economies into larger economic regions. (12) The process
of economic integration comprises those measures
designed to suppress or remove discrimina~ion.
3. Traditional Economic Integration Theory
,
~,
The origins of the theory of economic integration can
be found in the introduction of the concep~~ of "trade
diversion and tr.ade croation" (13)
Trade diversion arises when removal of tariffs within
a region results in previously low cost products from
non-members of the region being replaced by highE!r
cost products from members which benefit from the
removal of tariffs.
Trade tiheory postulates that if courrcr-Les at a similar
stage of development enter into trade, competi tion
between their industries results in producing lower
cost, higher equality products through competition and
spurs the growth of innovation. Moreover, other
industries are established as low cost products
replace previously high cos·t products resulting in
creating more opportunities for trade and investment
(trade creation effects).
Generally economic integration is concerned with the
-- ---- ------~--~-- -~~----------
7discriminatory removal of all trade impediments
between participating nations and wi"t:h the
establishment of certain elements of co-operation and
co-ordination between them. (J.4)
~
I
The theory recognises, that certain conditions must
prevail in o~der for economic integration to produce
benef its. It suggests that the welfare gains are
maximised when integration occurs among countries
which are at a similar level of indust.rial
development, have competitive industrial sectors, and
have potential to develop complementarities which
capture gains from economies of scale. The theory
assumes the existence of a highly industrialised
region where intra-regional trade will be Lncreased
substantially. It also assume$ that the economies of
scale will operate and that "pre-existing patterns. of
trade accurately reflects the comparative ~~vantage of
countries in traded commod i,ties.
IBased on the idea that Regional Economic Integrationoccurs in a stage by stage fashion, a body ofliter'ature exist.s dealing with the different stages:
+ Free-trade area: Trade barriers are removed
between members while each country retains its I
separate national barriers against ·tradewith the
rest of the world.
• ,9ustoms Union: All barriers to trade between
members are removed and a common set of external
barriers is adopted .
.Qommon market: Goods as well as factors of
production (labour and capital) may move freely
throughout the market.
• Fu~l economic_union: Member countries unify all
their economic policies, including mon6tary,
fiscal and welfare policies, as well as policies
------.- ------~~-~---------
8with respect to trade and factor movements.
other concepts which need clarification sO as to avoid
misunderstandings are the concepts of dependence and
interdependence.
Following Keohane and Nye, "dependence means a state
of being determined or significantly affected by
external forces" .(~5) The most widely accepted
def'":.nition of dependence in the literature is that
provided by Dos Santos = "dependl':!1ceis a situation in
which the economy of certain countries is conditioned
by the development and expansion of another
economy" •(16) These definitions present Dependence as
a dialectical concept in that it involves two or more
actors. In a situation of dependence involving two
actors, one is totally dependent on the other, and
conversely that the latter can discard the former
without any effects whatsoever on itself •.
In any relationship, there is normally some degree of
reciprocity. In most cases it is, therefore,
warranted to speak of interdependence which Keohane
and Nye say "most simply defined, means mutual
dependence. Interdependence in world politics refers
to situations characterised by recj.procal effects
among actors in different countries". (17) However, a
state of int~rdependence between two or more actors
does not entail that the reciprocal effects are
distributed evenly to either side of the
relationship. (18)
An analysis of interstate relationships in.a region
such as that of Southern Africa will be incomplete if
the scope does look at the existence of any level of
dependence and interdependence between South Africa
and the other members of the SADe.
I
I
the creation of the SADCC. This will provide the
9
E. DELIMITATION
This study will examine the evolution of the economic
relationship between South Africa and the region from
1978 to the present. The year 1978 was chosen because
it marked the adoption by South Africa of its -eotal
strategy policy and was follo1j.ledtwo years later by
necessary historical background to a discussion of the
contemporary issue of South African incorporation into
regional economical structures.
~
~
~
I
I
I
I
I
i
I
I
With regard t.o spatial limitation, the study will
focus solely on the southern African region,
comprising the following eleven states: Zambia,
Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Angola;
Swaziland, Namibia, Lesotho, Mozambique, South .f,.frica.
Any review of co-operation within southern.~frica must
talce cognisance of the nat.ure of the \'lOrld·economy and
its impact on the region.
F. ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY
The thesis is divided into six chapters.,
i
Scholars have stressed that c07operation and
integration is an important instrument for and
potentially an effective means of, facilitating
development among the SADe countries. It immediately
becomes evident that for co-operation and integration
to bring about economic growth and development new
approaches must be found to meet southern Africa's
problems and needs.
Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five present discussion
and analysis of the political economy of southern
Africa, the South African policy of destabilisatjon,
10
the failures and Sll,CCeSSes of the SADCC and the
implication of political changes in South Africa for
regional relations.
More specifically, Chapter Two considers southern
Africa I s pol.itical economy from 1978 to the end of
1989. It focuses on South Africa's policy of
destabilisation towards its nei.ghbours until the end
of the 1980's when the dismantling of apartheid hegan.
Chapter Three examines the activity of SADCC, its
successes and its shortcomings,
transformation into the SADC.
until its
Chapter Four discusses the int,arnational and regional
implications of the ending of apartheid on the past
political economy of the region as analysed in the two
preceding chapters. A focus of the argq~ent in the
discussion here is that regional and Lrice.rnat.Lcna I
factors will be shown to have a positive influence on
economic co-operation and integration in southern
Africa.
v
In Chapter Five, proposals for successful regional
economic co-operation are presented, drawing on
approaches qu.oted in the economi.c development
literature. Past experiences of economic integration
serve as the background for the analysis of economic
co-operation in southern Africa.
Chapter Six summarizes and concludes the study.
G. JNVESTIGATlVE APPROACH
ReaQings were supplemented by interviews.
11
~
I
1. Libraries
Libraries have been useful for the compilation of this
proposed research. Libraries at the University of the
Witwatersrand; Africana Library, Wartenweiler
Library, William Cullen Librar:.rI and the South African
Insti tute of International Affairs (J'an Smuts House
Library); the University of South Africa, as well as
libraries in the greater Johannesburg area offer
adequate material.
2. Interviews
Interviews constituted a very important source of
information. Interviews were conducted with various
officials of the S.~DCI and also officially accredited
diplomatic representatives to South Africa from
soutihevn African countries.
3. Other .ft.ou:(r!.ru2.
These included newspaper' and journal articles and
reports. SADereports, readily aveLLab't,e from its
offices in Gaberone, were consulted. Press cuttings,
available in the Jan SmutsHouse library, provided the
nlajor sources for newspapers. I also q_ttended sever-al
cOHferences that were relevant to the study.
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FROM 1978 TO 1989
INTRODUCTIOl[
This chapter wi11 examine South A,r i.can regional foreign
policy and the economic relationship between South Africa
and its neighbouring states from 1978 to 1989. Fr'omthat
date, South African foreign policy was reorganised and
the policies of 'total onslaught' and 'total strat.egy'were
adopted by the South African regime. These two strategies
shaped South African foreign policy until early 1990 when
apartheid began to crumble. The direct consequence was
that the regional corrc=xr aJ00 attained a new prominence.
On the one hand, South African military and economic power
was increasingly being used to destabilise politically
neighbouring states. On the other I the creation of the
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
(SADCC) in 1.980 further undermined the buffer states
strategy which South African regional policy had relied
upon in the pas't .
A. ASPECTS OF ~~E SOUTH AFRICAN REGIONAL'POLICY.
1. Brief Hist.orical Outline I:>fthe Roots of South
Africa's Foreign Policy
The way in ~Jhich South Africa has sought ·toshape an
agreeable regional-environment for itself has change~
as circumstances in the region and the world, as well
as within the Republic, have changed.
While south African rpgional policy has changed
according to ci.zcums canoes , :Lt has re·tained some
enduring and fundamental objectives. All South
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African governments from Jan snu+s to Louis Botha have
consistently been guided by a desire to have an
environment
Republic's
interests. 1
in soucherri
political,
Africa favourable to the
economic and strategic
In common with other states, South Africa's regional
policy has been influenced by its domestic base.
However, the importance of domestic policy. as an
influence on regional policy is far more profbund in
South Africa's case. The nature of the country's
internal political order dominated by 'the policy of
apartheid placed severe constraints on her foreign
policy.
Another long-standing objective of South African
regional policy was to assert its hegemq~y over the
s·tates of the region, and to become the
internationally recognised \regional power I in
southern Africa. r.rhedependency of states in the
reg-ion upon South Africa (trade, transport, labour)
has developed historically through a process of
co Iorid af.-enqender-edunequal economic devel.opmerrt, The
structural distortions of southern Africa's economies
derive from historical forces which;'exploi ted t.he
region primarily in the interests of colonial powers
and white settlers.
Historically the development of
capitalism in southern Africa led to
the formation of a regional sUb-system
in which the principal poles of
accllmulation were located in South
Africa.2.
Thus, an aim of South Africa's regional policy, beside
the protection of apartheid, has been to perpetuate
this colonial legacy_
more complicated case. Three ri~a1 nationalist
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South A.fricathought to maintain this centre-periphe:r.-y
structure by creating a peaceful, beneficial African
environment. Fer this reason, fldespite the lack of
well crystallized common political interests,
various South African prime ministers did entertain
r sq Loria L designs from time to time". 3 In the 1950s t
South African leaders set up grandiose plans for
various forms of Pan-African co-operation to be
governed by white South Africans. These plans
disintegrated but South Africa has never f.oregone
their entire or partial implementation. south Africa
however succeeded in maintaining the Southern African
Customs Union (SACU) which has been in existence since.
1910.
The gaining ot independence by Mozambique and Angola
under the governments formed by the liberation
movements/the Front for 'the Liberation o~.Mozambique
(FRELIMO) and the Popular Hovement for the' Liberation
of Angola (MPLA), respectively, produced severe South
African disillusionment. In ,April 1974, t.he
Portuguese government was overthrown and replaced by
a military council amenable to the decolonisation of
Angola and Mozambique. In Mozambique, power was
transferred to FRELIMO at independence. Angola was a
movements were to prepare Angola for independence on
November 11, 1975. Attempts by the movements
deteriorated into civil war and precipitated South
African intervention, undermining the international
policy of detente. The emergence in Luanda and Maputo
of regimes politically and Ldeo l.cqf.caLl.y hostile to
Pretoria meant that South Africa lost two vital links
in its attempt to create a Commonwealth in the region.
The Soweto uprising in 19'76 furthe:r:contributed to
deepening the crisis and destroying the remaining
ilnpetus for other states in the region to mainta.in
peacefully "cooperate
strategy was not new ,
with one another"!;. This
It was in line with past
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dialogue with South Africa.
It was in the search of an alternative option to this
regional crisis that South African Foreign Minister
pik Botha reiterated in 1978 the idea of a
"Constellation of States"4(COSANS) which would
2. Total strategy (1978)
initiati ves to create an association of Black and
White states, with South Africa as the centr~. The
idea of a Constellation of states arose after the
adoption by South Africa of a 'total strategy' policy
a year earlier. This strategy was prescribed in t.he
"Defence White Paper"G and it called for the co-
ordination of internal and external strategies
covering four sectors: eoonomi.c, mili.tary, diplomatic
and political. Under the rule of pres ident p.W.
soena, the total st'ategy became the of~~cial 'state
policy and the Constellation of States i"t:::, ultimate
objective.
South African policy-makers have long advocated the
idea of regional co-operation in southern Africa.
With the assumption of power by ,P.W. Botha in
September 1978, the apartheid state was substantially
re-organised and the total strategy was adoptied as
official policy.
South Africa's basic objectives in the region were
economic, pol~tical and security hegemony. The three
were interlocked and were mutually reinforcing, eVen
if they differed in particular circumstances. The
purpose of the total strategy was to lncbillse and co-
ordinate all South Africa'L resources against what was
perceived by her regime au a 'total threat' to the
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achievement of objectives, and ultimately to its
survival. According to P W Botha:
A country which is facing a total
onslaught has to have a total strategy
to combat it. This onslaught is not
just military but political, economic
and psychological. Against this
background it is essential that South
Africa's strategy should be a total
one, in which military, political and
economic factors all playa part?
a Objectives
Three objectives can be identified behind the policy
of total strategy. Firstly lit was intended to define
the vague notion of Constellation of states used in
the past by Prime Minister ,John Vorster and his
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hilgard Muller, in the..mid-1970's. Nei.ther. of them tlsE'ldthe concept
consistently nor clarified its meaning in detail.
President Botha, however, became identified wi.th the
concept; not only did he consistently use the
expression, but he also sought to give it a substance
previously lacking8• Botha advocated the creation of
a peaceful Constellation of Southern African states,
in which the individual states would have respect for
,
each other's cultures I tradi tions and Ldeas". The
intention might have been to destroy the image of non-
racial states in the SADCC region as a model for South
Africa.
Secondly, it muat; be borne in mind that the need to
develop' a policy of a Constellation of States was a
direct result of the worsening situation of the
apartheid state. The Pretoria regime developed this
policy as a counter strategy to a \Marxist onslaught'
which the country was facing from the internal and
external forces committed to the violent overthrow of
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the existing order. The policy was aimed at ensuring
that "soviet Bloc powers do not gain a political and
least of all a military foothold in Southern African
states"l.o• It can therefore be argued that the counter
strategy was intended to "conc.Iude with regional
states \non-aggression I pacts 1111 , and so, to maintain
white rule in South Africa by eroding external support
for the liberation movements. Th~s objective was
defined by the South African government as being to
ensure that:
neighbouring states are not used as
springboards for guerilla or terrorist
attacks on South Africa ...Furthermore,
South Africa would wish that black
states in the region (not merely
neighbouring countries) would not
provide training facilities for anti-
South African liberation movements and,
ideally, would not allow the fighting
transit facilities or allow the
movements to establish offices in their
countrr i.es-",
Thirdly f the last objective was economically
orientated. It aimed at thwarting any attempts by
independent stiat.esof the region to reduce their
economic dependence on South Africa. The relevant
countries wouln share interest in trade, agriculture,
transportation, health, labour, power and energy', and
scientific and technological developmeritu•
It can be argued that the total strategy policy bad as
its regional aim to secure recognition of South
Africa's economic domination in the area and to thwart
attempts by the SADCC countries to lessen their
.economic dependence on South Africa.
b The Application of the Total strategy
The total strategy waR originally intended to
incorporate alternative stands: the development of
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the idea of a Constellation of states and the pursuit
of an intense destabilisation of the neighbouring
states.
since its inception, the concept of a Constellation of
states; was met with sCepticism and disbelief by
critical observers both inside an.; outside the
country. It was widely believed that "South Africa
was actively trying to bring to power sympathetic
governments in independent Zimbabwe and ~amibia,
thereby creating a cordon sanitaire of anti-communist
countries around it".H The key to the whole project
was to have been Zimbabwel.5• If Zimbabwe could be
brought to an internationally recognised independence
under a government led by Bishop Muzorewa, it was
calculated that it would be a willing adherent of the
Constellation.
The Constellation was intended to include the then
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and the tt.enSouth West Africa
(now Namibia) after their independence I and the two
most conservative states with already strong economic
links with souch Africa, Malawi and Swaziland, as ,~ell
as the two remaining members of the southern Afr:tcan
Customs Union (SAeU), Lesotho and Botswana, and the
Pretoria 'homelands'. The Lnclusdorr of zaire was
conceived as a pillar to pressurise Zambia to adhere.
Only three countries were not given much attention by
the South African policy makers: Angola and
Mozambique, because of their communist-orientated
ideology I and Tanzania which followed the African
Socialism approach.
others considered the Constellation as "apartheid on
a new offensive I as the latest version of a long-
standing expansionist desire which aimed at reducing
Black South African countries to client states"."
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The vision of this geo-economic community of interest
was flatly rejected by all Lndependerrt, states in the
region, including the members of the SACU. The South
African ho};'e for a Constellation of States failed to
materialise. Its implementation was shattered largely
by two related events in the early 1980s.
The first was the defeat of Huzorewa in the Zimbabwean
independence elections. The victory of the 2imbabwe
African National Union (ZANUPF) put paid to ~ny hope
that Zimbabwe would become the key to the early
es'tablishment of a South African dominated Constel-
lation. Ins·coa'.iI independent Zimbabwe became a member
of the Frontline States alliance.
The second everrc was the creation of the Southern
African Development Co-ordination Confer.ence (SADCC)in
1980 ~ a designation which reflected t.he BJ.~c}~states'
opposition to South Africa's vi.sLon of consce l Lat.Lon.
SADCCbecame "'I':he symboL Cl:11dtangible embodiment of
the political economy of Southern African J Lber a-
tion" .17 SADCCwas a poli tical··econo~nic proiect of the
independent states of the region: Angf)la I BotiswanaJ
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, swaz i.Land , r.r.anr.::ania,
Zambia and ZimbabweI Wi't'1 the stated aim of redut:..ing
the region I s dependence on 1;he apaz-t.hei.d regime.
Consequently I the SADCC came to be perclai ved by
apartheid South Africa as a dangerous enemy of its
regional hegemony. Indeed, the SADCCfactor made a
difference in that it added a new dimension to the
conflict. It represented a collective effort to stand
up to the Pretoria regime, which was pr evLous Ly
absent.
3. _'JljleDestabilisa.t.ion Policy
The creation of the SADCCopened a new era for the
22
South African policy of 'total strategy'. The
political economy of the region became characterised
by the existence of tlNO competing groups. South
Africa's idea of a Constellation of states, seeking to
sustain and ensure white economic and military
supremacy at home and in the region, was at variance
with the economic liberation which was the aim of the
SADCC. In fact I constellation and economic liberation
were diametrically opposed, they could not co-exist.
Under the rapidly changing geo-political situ~tion in
the region, the apartheid regime realized that. the
Constellation of states could never be implemented.
within South Africa, the SADCC was regarded as a
threat. SADCC's success could increase South Africa's
isolation and eQuId lead to oountries of the region
becoming further involved in the liberation struggle
against apartheid1.8•
The Pretoria regime was forced by the new regional
order to change its policy. It opted for a more rigid
approach. A mix of military presaure and economic
manipulation characterized South Africa's policy
towards its nea.qhbours until early 1989 after the
accession to power of President De Klerk. These
policies were aimed at inflicting neg~tive results on
the SADCC through economic and military destabi-
lisation. Economically I two destabilising tactics
were used. First. was the use of economic incentives
(positive sanctions) such as direct private invest-
ments, economic assis"Cance! transport facilities,
mi.qrant; labour, :ood and energy. 19 A revie\oJof the
Lusaka Decl"":.d't:i<..·nof 1980 I in which the SADCC' s
objectives were outlined, indicates that it was
precisely these historical, artificial linkages that
were to be altered if regional struutural
transformation was to occur. Acoording to the Lusaka
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Declaration, a successful altera~ion of the existing
linkages would result in:
linlited economic integratio11 between South Africa
and 'the SADCC member states
symmetrical economic interaction between the
SADCC m~mber states
expansion of econo~ic interaction among the SADCC
member states.
Second was the use of negative economic sanctions in
the form of economic penalties. These comprised the
withholding or withdrawal of incentives such as
mentioned previouslYt and could be either threatened
or actually implemented actions.
Since one of the strengths of the South African
government, its economic power, had .~ot proved
cffecti sre in tempering support for anti -apar tric Ld
movements nor in preventing the members of the SADCC
from escaping its economic orbit, a consensus decision
was taken by the South African policy-makers to use
military power.
The use of brute force took. multiple forms: commando
raids (e.g. Matola, Mozambique, in Jan~ary 1981) i so-
called hot pursuits of guerilla forces (particularly
in Angola); destruction of physical infrastructure
(e.g. Zambia in october 1979); assassinations by
letterbomb and hired killers (e.g. Joe Qgabi in July
1981); massacres (Kassinga, Angola in May 1978).~
B. THE EFFECTS OF DESTABILISATION ON THE SADCC COUNTRIES
The effects of the policy of destabilisation adopted
by the Pretoria regime will be discussed within the
context of the SADCC sectors of actions. It had been
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said by the heads uf states of SADCC members that so
long as the SADCC countries lacked an integrated
transport and communication system, food security,
ener.gysupply, trade and industry pOlicies, to de-link
them from the imposed dependence! it would be
difficult for them to prevent such destabilisatiorl
{'"romcrippling their natural development efforts. In
this thesis, the effects of South African
destabilisation on trC',nsport,food and energy only
will be considered.
1. ~ransport
Both the SADCC and South Africa perceived transport as
vital to the fulfilment of their economic objectives.
For the SADCC countries I transport was the key to
liberation; for South Africa, it was a tool for
c0ntinued domination.~
since the time of its foundation, the SADCC
concentrated its efforts on the rehabilitation of
regional transport infrastructure as central to the
reduction of dependence on South Africa. For the
SADCC I "the establishment of a viable regional surface
transport system is a prerequisite for effective co-
operation and development, particular,ly since six of
the n,.....ubers are landlocked 11220
The dependence of landlocked countries north of the
Limp('l"loRiver on South Africa's ports and railways was
artit .l..ciallybased as these were not their nat.ural
outlets for their forei.gn trade. Traditionally, "$0
percent of international traffic from/to Zambia,
Zimbabwe (the then Rhodesia) I zaire and Malawi was
shipped through the ports of Mozambique and Angola,
whilst only 20 percent was shipped through South
Africa's ports"". South Africa's railways were
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carrying most of the imports of Botswana, Lesotho and
Swaziland and the export traffic of Botswana and
Lesotho. The war for independence in both Angola and
Hozamb:i.quedisrupted these outlets 'to the seal leaving
South Africa as the only alternativE> 0 By 19801
"traffic flows had radically changed with 80 percent
of goods being shipped through. the ports of south
Africa ar only 20 percent through the ports of
Mozambique'~'.1dTanzania" 24. South Africa by then saw
a way in which to perpetuate this dependence by
aggravating the war crisis in AnqoLr, and Mozambique.
The dependence of the stat~s of the SADCCon South
Africa was highlighted by their dependence on the
South African transport system, including the ports.
Any at+empc by tbe SADCC~:oterminate this dependence
in transport represented a potentially mortal threat
to South Africa's political-economic pre~pminance in
the zeqLon For Lhls reason the viability of the
SADCCtr ..r~.Jport system became central to pretoria 's
destabilisation policy. In 1981, South African
policy-makers set out, a list of possible measures
ag&lnst neighbouring countries which could be applied
in its own interests. Amongst them were, as
previously mentioned, "the provision of economic
incenti ves to co-operation on +hs. one handI or
puniti ve actions of an economic nature I or 'the threat
thereof on the other",25 as well as military force.
I
I
I
The use of economic incentives took preference over
the use of military power. The reason behind this
beLnq that force is disruptive, "it f.iisrut,t.3 exports
and related profits, while incentives do :not.1t26
South Africa has used its transport system to build
and manipulate 1.inks \'.dth its neighbours. Examples of
the use of this tC\ctic are many. The best known i$
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the SAeuI whereby income from railways, imr )rt and
othe~ related cha~ges are collected jointly and
distributed by South j\frica -to the other members
(Bot.swana, L~lsotho and Swaziland). Also under South
Africa control are the varioL'; arrangements providing
Locomot.Lve wagons (to Zambia and Zimbabwe) and
technical assistance to ~che Southern African state
Railways. It should not be assumed, howev~r, that the
incentive element did not affect the SADCCtransport.
F. tly, "they were used to ensure that SADCCstates
c....., \ .nue to use South African railwdYs and harbours
't-Jhen i'i: would not otherwise be i:r. their direct
economic ir.terest to do so II • -;Z7
Secondly, Lenefi ts to one southern Afr Lean state may
be highly damaging to the economi.c j nterests of others
and may increase the difficulty of operating a
:t:egional project of political economic of-,iberation28.
FOl: exampLe, the cont.r'ac c rates on ext(~inal traffic
between Zimbabw,~ and South Africa were carefully
tailored to undercut those of the M02amb.icanrail and
port system'l9. Furthermor~ I t.he apparent generosity
was often either totally unreal or at Least; concealed
a radically unequal division of gain.
The puni ti ve use of economic Lncent i.vas was exerted to
apply political pressure on SADCC' member states30•
This was a powerful economic sanction. As witb the
incentives, the threats varied. The most publicised
incident was the withdrawal at short notice of 24
Locomccf.ves on loan to Zimbabwe from South Africa(31).
This exacerbated Zimbabwe's tran~por\~ crisis and
severely hampered the expor+at.Lon of surpf.us maize to
neighbours in need. To meet the demand from Zaire,
Zimbabweneeded to send 80 to 90 _c~i:lw"lgons a week to
Kii1shCl~--:\,but it was only managing 56 wagons(32). Also
advers!.:Jly affected were ·the 1 000 tens of maize due
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for Malawi and 75 000 tons for Mozambique(331e-
This infl:tl.Lity tI..' transport maize expoz-ts had a
regional significance. Zimbabwes relatively deve-
loped economy, partio..11arly its agricultural sector,
offered the SADCCcountries some kind of alternative
to the tradi ti-:-nal reliance on South Africa.
consequently, Pretoria clearly attempted to
demonstrate that even Zimbabwewas not immun~to South
African blackmail.
Selecti ve interruption of the ..ow of key goods I
especially petroleum products I ft:J.:tilisers and grain,
to the SADCCstates, apparently for technical reasonst
was in fact linked to political and security demands.
South Africa at one time or another.cut rail traffic
to its neighbours as well as withdrawing at short
notice Locomoni.ves and wagons on loan t9. respective
railvmys. All of the independent scates' of souuhern
Africa, except Angola and Tanzania (which do not
import or export via South Africa) were beaten with
this stick more tpan once after the formation of the
SADCCin 1980. Technical problems in relation to the
export of goods, such as Zimbabwesteel and Botswana
beef I t, ::1:'8 matched by similar import delays(34).
When, from the point of view of South Africa, neither
the \carrotn' not thE~ \sticks I of an economic nature
proved effective, the apartheid regime resorted to
harsher means of subordinating neighbours and the
coarcdva use of force was brought in to play(35).
'rhe objectives of Pretoria's war of destabilisation
were not always stated. Basically, the use of
military force was intended to defend the traditional
structural dependency and control mechanisms that were
beginning to erode uncleI' the SADCCinitiatives.
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Demandswere generally made for the expulsion of the
African National Congress (ANC)and South West African
People's Organisation (SWAPO) from neLqhbourLnq
terri tories, and recognition, through agreements on
security and co-operation, of South Africa's regional
hegemony.
since Mozambique and Angola were of strategic
importance for the realisation of Sp~DCC projects I witIl
their outlets to the sea, they became the principal
targets for military d~stabilisation by Su!~h·Africa.
The strategic motive for the execution of
destabilisation by the South African security forces
is best explained by the dynamics of the regional
transport network. Transport. and communications have
accounted for 64 percent of the amvunt spent on all
SADCCprojects si.nce 1980(:36).
But despite the best efforts of the Sl~DCCand its
international donors to orientate the regional
transport infrastructure away from South Africa, the
latter remained dominant in the area. This was
purportedly due to the strategy of destabilisation
which often caused the closure of a r.ailway almost as
soon as it opened.
For example, in 1980, 80 percent of tx:ade from the
landlocked SADCC stat.es, passed chrouqh South
Africa(:>7). By 1982, the level of trade going through
South Africa had shrunk to 50 percent witIl the opening
of the. line through Zimbabweand Mozambique:l8). Bu1:-by
1985 most traffic was again passing through South
Africa because of the Benguela railway in Angola being
closed in late 1980 by the South Afr:i.can-backed UNl'I'A
forces. The Beira-Ma1awi line was closed in 1982 by
Renamoguerri11af~, as was the Maputo-Zimbabwe.....Lne in
..
29
1983, and the Nacala-Malawi line in 1985.
By eliminating Mozambique and Angola as outlets for
SADCC goods I Pretoric was able to channel most of
these through Zimbabwe. As a result of South Africa's
military destanilisation of Mozambique's and Angola's
transport network, by early 1987 the Nacala and Lobito
port transport sysrcens were inoperative I and the
Maputo and Beira lines were only partially operative.
This resulted in the SADCC states being more d~pendent
on the South African transport system than tn ).980.
When Malawi apparently grew too close to the SADCC by
1984, "the MNR crippled the Nacala and Beira lines
linking that country to the coast,J('38)forcing Malawi t.o
road haul its goods into Zimbabwe and thence to South
Africa.
Donor countries have always responded P9~itively to
the r ehabd Ld.t.at.Lcn of 'the transport nei.:.1ilCJJ:kin t.he
SADCC countries. By 1984, the 124 approved projects
either had funding or were negotiating it to the value
of $ 1.46m(40). How(?ver, the high risk of funding these
projeots left some, such as the Benguela
rehabili'tation, unfunded. The Benguela line has been
a target for the UNI~~A rebels who have sabotaged the
line since the uar started in Angola.,' Indeed, it W:iS
useless to develop railways, ports, an~ roads and then
to watch as they were blown up. These acts of
sabotage directed at the SADCC countries reduced the
value of economic assistance received by them from the
Western countries.
2. Food
The use of
behaviour
discounted.
food as a weapon that can change the
of nation states has generally been
It has been described as a 'singularly
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ineffective' instrument of foreign policyC4l). There
are a number of reasons for this: (42)
A food embargo as an act of economic warfare
against a foreign country would also have
financial and social costs for the expoxt.Lnq
country, in terms of lost foreign exchange
earnings from its expo-ted product.
Since no country is completely dependent on
imported food, and certainly not from a single
food exporting country, a denial of food~imports
would not have an immediate impact I necessitating
a change in state behaviour or policy.
Nevertheless the link between transport systems and
food supply in the region t made food export, food aid I
a relevant factor in southern Africa.
Tho continued South African de;:;tabilisat:ion of the
transport s~ctor had negative effects on the region's
food security. By 1980r President Dos santos of
Angola estimated that "total losses caused by South
Afri.can aggression against Angola were $10 billion.
ThiE..figure became even greater as fighting continued,
with whole towns b~ing disrupted, resulting in
increased foreign exchange expendd tiur'e on food
imports". (.t3) In Mozambique the civil war dd.sl.cca+ed
peasant farmers and created a serious refugee
problem. (44)
'Iihe humancosts are beyond comprehension and hard to
quantify. The excess ~ortality rate ~or infants and
children and others comes to 1.5 million Li.ves lost
over 1980~'88, as a direct or indirect consequence of
South Africa's regional s~rategy(~5). Almost half the
population of Angola and Mozambiquehave been driven
from their homes or are affected by war-induced
3:"
hunger. Estimai:.as f:t'om ';:)1e first half of. J.989
indicate that at les2t 1.~ million peopl~ were
refugees in neighbouring count.r Les(16).
While South Africa was pursuing a policy of
destabilisation against its nei.qhbours , the use of
food as a political weaponwas achi.evahl.e. 14"'\ Because
of the crisis in food production in southern Africa,
south Africa used food "as a foreign policy instrument
~o destabilize the governments of neighbouring states
and to force them to stop supporting the lineration
struggle in sout.n Africa and Namibi~."(48). We can,
therefore, understand the reasons behind the problems
that resulted in delays in the delivery of imports
experienc~c by the SADCCcountries during the 1980's.
Apart from ~e.mindingtham of South Africa's ability to
cripple the::'r economies, "these a.ctions were intended
to nampac good production and thus reinforce south
Africa'$ food powe:cv i.s=e-v i.e its naf.qhbours , a power
eroded in lr;81 ~<)yZimbabwe's large nai.ae surplus II (49) •
Surely, the ailn was to coerce the countries concerned
into changing their policies t()wards South Africa.
Regional destabilisation exacerbe.ted the decline in
the per-capita growth rate in food production,
experienced by the SADCCs:tates as a result of
d+Jught, rapid population growth I weakness in
agricultural development and a hostile external
eoonomi.c envi rcnmerrt ,
While proposed projec·t development in energy was of
major concern to the SADCCcountries, the davelopment
of two sectors, electrici'ty and oil production were
seriously hindered by South Africa's destabilisation
policy.
"
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One of the more dramatic examples of destabilisation
affecting energy supply occurred when South African
commandos blew up the oil tanks in Beira in December
1982, cutting off Zimbabwe's main source of fuel.
When Mozambique and Zimbabwe asked South ;"frica to
send more fuel, using the line through South Africa
via Komatipoort to Beit Bridge, South Africa refused.
This obliged Zimbabwe to buy its fuel from South
Africa, the deal having to include signature of a long
term contract. Zimbabwe held out, and an eIJIergency
system was developed to load from tankers fn Beira
harbour directly into the pipe line.
.. The sabotage of the petroleum refinery at Beira
a.1:'fectedMozambique's energy requirements. It also
created a severe fuel crisis in transport and
production in Zimbabwe was thus inevitably affected I
resulting in a decrease jn foreign exchange earnings.
Angola was no less affected than Mozambique. Angola's
economy relies haavd.Ly on its petroleum production
which accounted for 72 percent of export income in
1979 and about. 78 percent in 1981. (50)
A serious blow to Angola I s economy occurred when a
South African-backed commando raid, destroyed the
Luanda refinery in 1981. ThIs was the most serious of
four attacks on major energy installations carried out
within the country. One of the consequences of South
African destabilisation in Angola was the need to
spend oil revenues on the military effort instead of
on dev~lopment projeots to revive ,the country's
shattered economy. Further, the lengthy South Afril:;an
occupation of Namibia created an obstacle to the
deli very of power to Angola froIn the hydro-electric
station of Rucana, the generator of which is on the
Namibian side of the borde!.
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In respect of energy, the B.L.S. states (Botswana -
Lesotho Swaziland) and Zimbabwe are among the
countries of the region which depend on South Africa,
albeit to varying degrees. This fact is not due to
any paucity of energy resources but to the present
underdeveloped potential and inadequate
infrastructure. As a whole, the region is potentially
"lery rich in energy resources. Here again, South
Africa applied its policy of transport manipulation to
disrupt oil supplies to Botswana, Zimbabwe,. Lesotho
and Malawi.
c. I>..J.JoIITSOSOUTH1~~ICA'S DESTABILISAT;_[ONP LlCX.
Among different tactics used by South Africa to
destabilise the region t military powar consti tuted
the principal means. How9ver, this military option
confronted economic and political impedim~nts.
1. Economic Limitations
South African capital .. .. invested substantially in
some of the region's countries. Major investments by
South African mining houses, p:lrticularly the Anglo
American De Beer's group, go back half a century in
former northern and sou·thern Rhodesia, '(now Zambia and
Zimbabwe). For decade-s De Bem:'s was active in Angola
and Tanzania in t.he :mining and :lrketing of diamonds,
and it is the only foreign entity involved in
BotswanaI s diamond production and marketing today.
Hence, " South African military operation I bomni.nqs.•.
in the vicinity of these inv~stments"(51.) could not be
tolerated by the South African business community.
This same community would like to seE~ the region
dave Lop i'::'8 productive forces to serve as an outlet
for further investment.
"<;J
mili tary action against the SADCCcountirLes, Such
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TABLE 2.1 SUBSIDIARIES OF MAJOR SOIlTH AFRICAII FIRMS IN SOOTJIErui AFRICA
-
COUNTRIES SEC'l'ORS
AGRI KUlING CONSTROC- HAHUFAC- TRADE BANKING
BUSINESS l'ION TURING
Botswana 2 5 4 8 8 2
Lesotho 2 5 1 7 ., 1I
S\·;aziland :; 2 5 15 14 2
Namibia 4':; 14 5 10 9 1
Mozambique 0 0 0 1 0 0
Zimbabwe 1 25 7 97 12 2 IZambia 0 6 0 10 0 2
Malawi 0 0 1 4
I
0 I: 2
I
Total 55 57 23 152 50 12
-= •.. Source: U. Witulski, ~acroeconomic Linkages Among Southern African states. Weltform, Munich.
London. 1990, p.18S.
Based on the" premise that this section of ~he business
communityconstituted an Lmpor t.ant; foyce ill Lhe ruling
power bloc and was able to influence its decisions, it
became difficult for South l~frica to embark on a vast
action was not in the interests of that faction(52).
south African business leaders I whatever their
t)oli tical leaning, had long zecoqnd sed that apar-cheLd
posed an obstacle to economic growth~ For this reason
the business community took the first step in
initiating negotiations with the then banned ANC.
In August 1985, six South Africcm busLnes s leaders,
headed by the Chai;r:man of the Angl,) American
ccr-pcr'atii.cn, flew to Lusaka to me-t; members of the
ANC(B3) • When the encounter was disclosed after the
return of the mission to South Africa there was
considerable protest by the qovarnmerrc but the
meetingrs were, in effect, the opening round il'1 the
.1.','
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'negotiated revolution' Which took place over the
following nine years until the general democratic
elections of March 1994.
After the Zambianencounter, the process of discussion
with what came to be knownas the 'extra-parliamentary
groups' wac further pursued jj)ybusiness leaders, often
in defiance of the representative laws of the time.
A small action group, known as the Consultati ve
Business Movement~CBM)I was f'~)rmedon the ini.tiative,
in particular, of the chairman of African Explosives
and Chemical Industries(AECI), Johannesburg
consolidated Investments (JCI) and Premier. In 1989,
the CBMarranged an unpublicised conference at
Broederstroom which brought together industrial
leaders, church leaders .and extra-parliamentary groups
for an exchange of views, and allowed a future sizing-
up of positions and personalitilas(54}. After 2 February
1990, i"t was the CBl'Iwhich facilitated" lithe tirst
formal negotiations in the con'~ress for a Democratic
South Africa (CODESA),providinl;TI (and paying for) the
administrative secretariat and venue,,(55}.
Although business had no status in the negotiations it
acted, more or less discreetly and more or less in
concert, to help the process aLonq.,' especially by
providing advice on facili t.Las where needed (or
anticipated) .
The economic reali ties in southern AfrLea also put
some restraints on Pretoria's capabilities to escalate
the destabilisatiol1 of the SADCGcountries ..
In fact,
efforts,
the SADCCcountries, in sanction-busting
presented an important market for South
African products especially manufactured ones. It was
theref.ore I "of vi tal Lmpor-cance to maintain a good
(\ "
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relationship" (56) with neighbouring states.
south Africa enjoys an annual trade
surplus of Rl billion ($500m) with
SADCC, and faced with the possibility
of further shrinkage of its world
markets, S01..1thAfrican business is keen
to improve SA/SADce relations and that
involves a cessation of
destabilisation. (57)
South Africa's economic interests could best be served
by stable and eoonc-nfoaLLy healthy ne Lqhbour.s, The
extensive use of military destabilisation could
quickly have destroyed these opportunities and
contributed to a further weakening of the South
African economy and the power of the apartheid state.
It was clearly not in the overall in'-erest of South
African capitalists to see 'broken backed' states
established in the region. Such a situa:t.ionwas not
conducive to political and social stability in soutn
Africa, nor was it what the economy needed to survive.
It also undermined South Africa 1s medium and long ..erm
possibilities for economic expan~ion in the region.
2. 'politi.9..s.Ll,imitations
Following South Afri.can acts of aggression, the SADCC
states were, all together, motivated by the struggle
against apartheid. The SADCC' s reaction to South
Africa's aggression was a strengthening force for its
own legitimacy in opposing south Africa's efforts in
warning against any challenge to its r~~ Jnal hegemony
and internal political stability. In response to South
Africa's destabilisation actions both domestically and
regionally, the international communi ty was called
upon by the SADCC to impose comprehensive mandatory
sanctions against the apartheid regime(58). These
sanctions contributed to the weakening of the Pretoria
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government and consequent.ly to the demise of
apartheid.
The isolation varied from the highly sywbolic cutting
off of sporting ties to expulsion from internar:onal
organisations and the arms boycott. More severely,
the effects of isolation manifosted themselves in the
absence of new fore;qn investment and the act.ive
disinvestment campaign waged by the ANC in exile,
which weakened the state's economic powerba~e. The
regime's acts of aggression against the SADCC,
however, enhanced its security in the region.
Tolerance for violence from South Africa in the SADCC
countries increased and public preparedness for South
Africa's military destabilisation activities
developed. consequently, the support for South
African liberation movements (eg. ANC, SWAPO) also
increased despite the South African ~tt~~ks.
This chapter singled out apartheid as the main source of
conflict in the region. South Africa's regional policy was
to support any+ ing favouring destabilisation and the
weakening of the countries in the region. The use of
violence, economic sanctions. military f.orceI served to
maintain the hegemoniu status quo of South Africa in the
area. The South African government adopted the policy of
"total strategy" at regional level.
The total regional cost of South African destabilisation
activities has been immense. rehe ma.in elements in the
losses being loss of exports, excess transport costs, loss
of human lives. Almost three-qua:l;'~~rs of the costs have
been borne by Angola and Mozambique
Nevertheless, the continued existence of the SADCC until 2
-I '\
having survi~ed South Africa's
and also its failures, 'wil
chapter.
efforts *t destabilisation,
be examined in the next
Februa~y 1990, when the negotiations process for a
democratic South Africa 'Vias initiated, is proof of the
failure of the strategy of destabilisation pursued by south
Africa throughout the 80,fs against its neighbours.
The founding of the SADceprovided a forum for resisting
apartheid at regional level. 'Jlhe oombd.nati.Lonof SADCC
re~dstance and other favours such as revolutions,
rternational sanctions I locked the South African state
Lrrco a deteriorating strategic position. TodayI .with the
dismantli.ng of apartheid, the basic raison a"etre for
destabilisation has disappeared, but in the 1980s the
policy inflicted d~mage on the region from "'7hich it is
still in the proce~s of recovering.
The achievements of the SADtCduring the 1980S, apart from
'.
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SADCC; REAPPRAl£.AL
~N'l-RODUCTION
The SA.DCC
activities.
survived South Africa's destabilisation
Since August 1992 the SADCChas formalised
itself into the Southern African Development Community
(SADe). r.rhe formation of SADChas left no opt.Lon other
than to ask what the grouping (SADCC)has achieved, wherp
the shortcomings were. For this kind of assessment, not
only the SADCC'soriginal objectives need to be recalled
bl.'+:also the external and internal cf.rcumstiances appraised
u.idez which the organisation operated during its life time •.
1. origins
The SADCCwas formed in 1980 in terms of the Lusaka
Declaration by the six frontline states: Botswana,
Tanzania, MozambiqueI Zambia, zimbabwe and Angola,
together with Lesc)tho, Malawi and Swaziland. The main
objective for its creation was to ~e9uce the economic
dependence of member' states, espec.ra l.Ly ; but not
exc l usi vely, on South Africa. (1)
Efforts to begin development co-ordination were
initiated by the frontline states (Angola, Botswana,
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zamb~a) from 1977 to 1978.
l~s such the SADCCcan be seen as a "product of the
political liberation events dating back to UDIof 1965
and the Bubsequent attainment of political
independence in Mozambiqueand Angola". (2)
"The dynamics of political liberation
:initiatives to co-ordinate efforts to
struggle for the political liberation of
Namibia. It was in this spirit to
struggle, that frontline states adopte. a forum for
co-ordination among them. As the linkage between
political struggle and economic jectives became
clearer over time, discussions on economic co-
operation began to emerge.
led to the
support '~;he
Zimbabwe and
enhance the
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The South African effort to create a Constel1:ation of
States in which all the countries of the region would
co-operate, produced a counter move r
They chose a unique path to co-or~
and reduce dependence on South Africa.
11 other states.
e development,
'rhis initiated
a shift in the regional balance of power away from
South Africa. The developments which followed after
the Independence of Zimbabwe culminC!ted in the
adoption in J.980 of the t.usake Decl8.n:ttion on
Economic Liberation. In 1980, when the SADCC was
formed, the member states announced that an
independent Namibie. would join the SADCC.
2 • Ob~cti ves
Two inclusive objectives can be ident~'fied through the
experience of regional co-operation under the SADCC.
On the one hand, 'chere were eoonomi c objectives as
stipulated in the Lusaka Declaration.
In the Lusaka Decle,>.t:il.).t', t:h<!.:::SADCC set four
development objectives. 'r'heprincipal one was the
"reduction of economic dependency .l.rt:cularly, but
not only, on the Republic of SOUl...lL Africa". (3) The
S.ADCC was an attempt by the constituent members to
reduce their economic dependence on South Afri~a, by
acting as a conduit and a co-ordination centr~, for
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international aid and investment rather than through
promot~ng formal integration.
On the other hand, beyond its essentially practical
role of economic liberation, the SADCChad as its
central political role the struggle against continued
white minori ty :rule in South Africa and its
destabilisation policy. It is essential to remember
that the SADCCwas born more out of political concerns
than for economic development. (,1) According to Daniel
Ndlela, lithe origins of SADCCwere more political than
economic and political considerations runned (sic.)
strongly through all major SADCCdecl si.ons". OS)
The two objectives are linked by the fact 'that the
SADCCconsidered apartheid and destabilisation as
impediments to peaceful regional economic co-
operation. Destabilisation policy po~~ticised the
SADCCstGtcf3. They emv the pxojoct; :of reducing
dependence as explicitly necessary to reduce South
African economic power and ability to destabilise.
B. SADce RE~IONAL ECONOMIC APPROACH
Whencompared to other forms of regional economic co-
operation, the SAf.JCC's approach p:t;esents a unique
institutional structure which is its most distinctive
innovation. This innovative feature was based upon
the fact that the SADCCviewed insti t.ucLons as
facilitating and consequential rather than causative
forces or ends in themselves. (6) The organisation
opted for a decentr.alised, non-bureauor-at.Lc s~tructure
that required ttie maximumparticipation from the
memberstates.
..
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1. p'~centralised Approach
The emphasis was placed on the sensitivity of members
to infringements of their sovereignty. 'l'heinsistence
on the sanctity of national sovereignty was
fundamental to the SADCC' s modus operandi. The
determinants of the SADCC model of economic co-
operation were twofold.
Firstly f there was scepticism about the value of
tradi tional conceptual approaches. All the~ SADCC's
members were or had been members of economic bodies
which were unsuccessful because they were dominated by
one member. Tanzania had been a member of the East
African Community (EAC), dominated by Kenya. Malawi,
Zambia and Zimbabwe had been members of the Central
African Federation (CAF) , dominated by southern
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Angola and M~~ambique had
been members of the Lusophone Union dcminatcd by
Portugal; and Botswana, Lesotho and swaziland were
still members of SACU dominated by south Africa.
With painful memories of the past exper-i.encesthe
creators of the SADCC were determined to avoid the
situation where the organisation would be in the
position of dictating economic policy to its
consti tuent members. rrhe adopt.ion' of the term I Co-
ordination Conference' instead of 'community' or
customs, It'",metaryunions, or preferential trade., even
common market, was the SADCCl's strategy to avoid
conflict between sovereign states. Botswana's
President Quett Masire points out that. .
the SADCC has no treaty f no central
authority, no common currency and even
a common language ••• To understand
SADCC it is important first to know
what it is not. SADCC is not an
embryonic federation of states seeking
development pr Lor i ties, resource
institutlon affiliations and resource
endowment,
allocation
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to mould the development of national
economies on the basis of an overall
roaster pl an. S}'.DCCis not a common
market although increased trade is
certainly a pr ior ity. (7)
Secondly, the SADCC'spragmatic approach was a matter
of necessity because of the conditions under which it
operated. Many wr:..ters on southern Africa had
acknoNledged the IIprcblem of a peaceful co-existence
of different natii.ons in Southern Africa". (8) The
ccuntries were not only politically and econpmically
diverse, they also had conflicting economic and
political interests.
Economically, they had diverse production structures,
systems. on this laHt point, for example, they ranged
from countries with market-based medp.an.isms and
liberal trade policies, to Angola and MozEl.mbiqueI
countries which espoused Marxist-Leninist .ideologies
and central econondc planning on the now defunct
Soviet Union models and to Tanzania which adhered to
African Socialism. The foundation and the objective
of African Socialism was the extended family. The
Afrjcan Socialism was opposed to socialism which tried
to build its happy society on .a philosophy of
inevitable corrrLf.c'c between man and man.
Poli tically f they also had much less ill commonthan
might generally bE.lsupposed. All in all, they had a
shared heritage of experience of colonialism, of white
rule and, except for Mozambiqueand Angola, all of
them were members of the Commonwealth. But they
differed widely in their strategic and ideological
orientations I their poI i.t.Lca l, ~ystemst the composition
and interests 01 their ruling elite, and in their
atti.tudes towards regional integration. Certainly,
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after a long struggle and hard won political
independence, the~' were in no hurry to submerge their
newly acquired sovereignty in any supranational body.
They were, of course, united in their opposition to
white minori~y rule and in their concern about south
Africa's overwhelming power to destabilise the region.
In fact, their solidarity was to a degree based on the
existence of a common enemy, the apartheid system. At
the same time i they also had wide ranging attitudes
towards, and differing intererts in, their economic
Li.nk s with South Africa, which were also varied in
scope and content.
The realities of geography ~Jr a country like Lesotho
would ensure that for sound economic reasons, it would
continue to have close economic association with South
Africa. It would be unreasonable for Lesotho to use
harbours and ports other than South ~trican ones
bec..::c.luse uf 'their proximity to L(.:dutho. 'l!u.rthermore,
it does not make economic sense for Swaziland and
Lesotho to import from Zimbabwe instead of the Gauteng
area.
In theory these decentralised functional arrangements
are seen as avciding the need for a large central
administration at the secretariat a~d increasing the
proclivity for regional co-operation through active
participation by all membe' states. But in practice
some intermediate ad hoc institutional arrangements
have nevertheless proved necessary, for example in the
agricultural sector, an institution which started off
as an interim pr~ject to co-ordinate region~l
agricultural research (SACCAR), was later permanently
established. Thus, what started out as an interim co-
ordination device has evolved into distinct and
separate regional institutions which have established
ongoing links with other inte:::J"la1:ional:r.esearch
g
\
agricul ture and natural resources I
industry and trade, m~n~ow0r,
communication I and tour L>:[tl.
mining, energy,
transport and
50
institutions.
2. The degree to which .responsibility__ fo.t:
has be~n devolved ~QoperA~ional programm~s
nationa~overnm~~ts.
The SADCC E.:ssentialstructure \.;rasa regional etwork
of multilater~l projects in seven broad sectors:
t
I
Member states retained their authority in a key
sector. No projects were carried out by the SADCC as
a body. Instead, those which were located in a
particular country b~came the responsibility of that
country. If a project crossed a national boundary,
such as a road or a railway line lit was.C:i".lidedinto
two projects, administered by the two countries, not
by the SADCC. Regional studies were administ,ered by
the country responsible for the subject area. The
SADCC comprised fourteen sectors. These I together
with the countries r.esronsible for co-ordinating them,
appear in Table 3.1.
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TABLE 3.1: SADCC SEC'l'Oru.L RESPOMSIBIlJ.TIES CHART
council
of
Ministers
Angola Energy
Agricultatal Research
Botswana Livestock Production
Animal Disease Control
Tourism
Lesotho Environment and
Land HanngelJlent.
Inland Fisherie3/
Malawi Forestry and Wildlife
culture and Information
Ho?ambique Tranrnori:.and
COIlllUJIications
Sectoral
committee
of Ministers
sector
Coordin:l~
ting units
Harine Fisheries
and Resources
Swaziland Human Resources Development
Tanzania Industry and Trade
Zambia Mining
Zimbabwe Fuod, Agricultureand l: \;ral Resources
The strat.egyf then 1 was for the SAQCC m(::~\lbersto learn
to co-operate and depend on each o'cher I s initial
projects which were of obvious natural benefit, and
which did not require either p 1;.j to surrender
arything (eg. sovereignty).
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All members could contribute ideas and join in
discussion on an area; even if primary responsibility
was assigned to another member state. SADCC members
were encouraged to consider what they could do best
and how deeply they could afford to be invol"l,,'d at any
given time in any of their programmes. (9)
3. The balan_ge,_of power bei:ween the poli tic~tl_g..l1g
t)Ureaucratic_Qrgans.
The SADCC's innovative solution was a ~ highly
decentralised institution. It had a sm~ll sec~etariat
(based in Gaborone, Botswana) with only a d02en staff
and no decision-making power. It carri~d out limited
co-ordination duties, did research on regional issues
and took the lead in certain. regional policy
discussions. Power and responsibility were
decentralised in three ways:
annual meetings For individual sectors, decisions
Firstly, decisions were taken collectively for the
SADCC as a whole by heads of governments at their
were tak~n by meetings in the relevant ministries
(e.g. agriculture ministries).
Secondly, responsib~lity for each sec~or was passed to
a government to :::let up the administrative
infrastructure, and the relevant government 'had a
direct interest in making its sector work.
Thirdly, once a co-operating partner had agreed to
contribute to a part.icular project, the whole matter
was passed to the country where the project was to
take place. Thare, it was treated as part of the
bil~.teral aid proqi-emme ,
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SADCC projects, fer which funds were sought at the
Annual Consultative Conference of SADCC Member states
and Co-operating Partners, were actually a series of
national projects i.e. projects that were already part
of the National Development Plans of the member
states. Gains from investment in projects can only
occur when policies are conducive to success both in
the sector within wh5ch the project falls and in the
macro economy at large. At times, large unJertakings
have consequences beyond the individual sector to
influence some macroeconomic variables such as
employment" balance of
cistribution, to mention
and income
For these
payments,
just a fEO",'.
reasons, the SADC recognises that projects should be
p'l~a!medj n a manner consistent with essential reforms
in +.:hemc..croeconomicand s[actoral policies of member
countries if widespread regional welfare and
efficie~cy gains are to be realised •.
c..
.,.... SUCCESSES
Despite the adverse conditions under which the SADCC
operated during its lifetime, its p~rfo,t:'mancemay be
qualified as an overall success when'compared to other
economic groupings on the African continent.
a. ~ransport and communication
The_plSculiarities and realities of economic dependence
on South Africa influenced the dec isi.on to put top
priority on the rehabilitation of transport and
communications. With Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana,
Swaziland and Zalubia having to Lmpoxt; maize in the
largest amounts in recent: history I the capacity of
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regional railways became a matter of life and death.
By setting the development of railways and ports as
top priority in 1980, the SADCC assured 'thattransport
corridors from Beira and Maputo, Mozambique and Dar es
Salam, Tanzania, were able to handle this enormous
increase in demand. As far as successes are
concern~d, this sector proved to be the most
successful although South Africa was still an
important outlet to the sea for several states in the
regjon.
Many corridors were in operation even though not to
full capacity. The Limpopo corridor from Maputo to
Harare was secured from Renamo attacks. The Dar es
saf.an corridor brought maize to Zambia and Malawi.
The Beira corridor alone handled more maize in. the
first two weeks of April 1992 than all of the South
African rails and roads. The SADCC cou~<:lrightfully
claim it had reduced its dependence on South Afric~n
transport lines. Examples are many. Tons of goods
handled at Maputo port increased from 2.263 million in
1989 to 2.955 mi~lion in 1990, an increase of 12%. (9)
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the increase in SADC traffic
through Beira and Maputo.
\.1
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TABLE 3.2: TRANSIT TRAFFIC T8ROOGH BEIRA, 1993 AND 1994 (TOMS)
COlJ'~RY 1993 1994
EXPORTS IMPORTS(!) EXPORTS IMPORi'S TOTAL
TOTAL
Dry cargo:
Botswana 1700 1700 3400 1500 1500
Malawi 18600 29700 48300 49400 91100 140!SOO
Zambia 56500 2890C 85400 462UO 78100 124:100
Zimbabwe 334900 - ~OO 561100 480700 218200 698900
Unidentified .000 90000 85000 85000
Sub-total. 411700 376500 788200 576300 4739S0 1050200
Fuels: Zimbabwe 990300 990300 1070900 1070900
Total 411700 13668000 1778500 576300 1544800 2121100----
Note: (a) Excludes drought relic thlports of 370200 tons.
" Source: Th;G Ltd.
'fABLE 3.3: TRANSIT TRAFFIC (DRY CARGO) THROUGH MAPUTO/HA'l'OLA, 1993 AND 1994 (TONS)
COUNTRY 1993 1994
EXPORTS IMPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS IMPORTS TOTAL
South Africa (Komatipoort) 517000 517000 600500 600500
Swa~ilund (Goba) 109900 109900 146600 2600 149200
~ !i,b,bwe (Limpopo) 126600 101700 228000 468600 2000 470600
7!53200 101700 85490~ 1215700 4600 H20300Total ::
:: ----
Source: BeG Ltd.
,
• As far as ports and shipping are concerned, with thecompletion, in 1991, of most rehabilitation works at
Beira (whose new container terminal was commissioned
in April 1992), "the combined SADCC ports' annual
capaci ty increased by about 2.4 million I from 25,9
million in 1990 1:0 28,3 million in 1991". (10) In
response to the drought in 1992-93, the regional ports
of Dar as Salam, Nacala, Beira, Maputo and Walvis Bay
handled 2,5 million t.ons of emergency food imports
.iII
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compared to 2,6 million tons handled by all South
African ports. l1.2). The port of Maputo handled more
tonnage than the port of Dur'ban, a fact difficult to
imagine ten years earlier. (13)
Railway lines are in good condition in southern
Africa. The decline in traffic carrying "from about
1.6 million tons in 1990 to 1.2 million in 1991,,(14)was
attributed to reuuced traffic availability due to the
poor economic performance of user countries,
inadequate rolling stock, sub-optimal operations and
increasing competition from road transport. Table 3.4
compares the traffic to and from neighbouring
countries on the South African rail networ}t:.
TABLE 3.4: RAIL TRAFFIC BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND NEIGHBOURS, 1982/83 AND 1994/95 (TONS)
~
1982/83 1994/95
To S.A. Frol S.A. To S.A . , FrOI S.A.
zaire 293 948 99 104 575 36 160
Zambia 156 485 238 132 82 734 82 776
zimbabwe 951 319 912 826 799 177 929 552
Mozambique 1 185 :30 1 154 787 14 233 623 045
Botswana 59 182 325 754 299 094 461 950
Lesotho 108 326 335 710 6 '108 217 553
Swaziland I 200 000 . 237 075( 475 653 280 090
Namibia 372 339(a) 755 9S1\a) 90 341 316 441
Total 3 326 949 4 059 349 1 768 564 2 947 567
Note:
Sources:
(a) 1984/85 figures.
South African Tra~sport Services for 1982/3; Verslag van die Advieskomitee vir
Vervoerdiem~te in S\lidwes-Mrika/Namibie for 1984/85; Spoornet for 1994/95.
Projects like Maseru International Airport in Lesotho,
rehabili tiatLon of the railway from Malawi to the port
of Naca La in Mozambique, and the new' road linking
Malawi to Tanzania would probably not have been
financed were it not for the SADCC.
_iii
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~. Mobilisation of funds.
It was self-evident that the sine qua n~n of giving
real corrcen+ ::.0 the SADCC' s hope of reducing the
neighr~uring states' 'dependence' on South Africa was
to relieve ·their almost total reliance upon South
Africa"s transport system. Very sensibly, therefore,
the SADCC's practical priorities were with the
logistical and financial difficulties of
rehabili tating and extending the region I s transport
infrastructure.
The SADCC achieved some success in mobilising and co-
ordinating aid flows to the region. It provided an
umbrella under which aid and investment for the member
states could be sheltered. It managed to
progressively convince and draw in those donors who,
at the beginning, were sceptical, if not outrightly
hostile towards its cause and not inclined to
contribute significantly to the collective effort.
'1'heWorld Bank, 1.:heunited Kingdom and the united
states were cases in point.
In 1987, a study jointly carried out by the
organisation for Economic co-operation and Development
(OECD) and SADCe analysts concluded that one of the,
SADCC's major achievements was to initiate and sustain
an extensive range of consultative mechanisms and
(:onsultations with international partners. The SADee
was remarkably successful in presenting its programmes
and policies to the international community t thus
attracting interest and resources from abroad and.
building a network of functi0nal relations
inter·.ationally and in the region. (15) Much of the
SADCC's success in attracting disproportionate amounts
of aid finance, compared with other parts of Africa,
is attributable to willingness to discuss its
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programmes.
There can be no doubt that increasing support for the
SADCC by the industrialised countries was motivated by
the existence of apartheid and South Africa's
destablisation policy against SADCC. with the
disappearance of apartheid some of the financial
support wh ich the SADCC enjoyed will probably
disappear as well. Here certainly lies a danger for
the new regional economic organization, SADC.
Much of the funding, and an increasing percentage of
projects were new, and that must have been the SADCC's
other big success. Especially important was the
mobilisation of private capital and export credits to
assist development projects. The SADCC was, in fact,
offering a seal of respectability to t.he donors or
financing countries who would otherwis.~ have been
concerned about; bi-lateral LnvoLvemerit., or the
question of formal links between individual states in
southern Africa and the European community. (16)
South Africa and southern Africa will have to compete
for international aid and assistance especially as the
end of the Cold War has brought about an end to
ideological differences be':':weenthe U~A and the former
Soviet Union.
The most persuasive an4 most subversive image of the.
SADCC was as a counter force to the South African
policy of apartheid and destabilisation.
c. Institutionalj.sa.tion.Q_f external depgndence: a common
enemy'
Throughout the SADCC region, a unique sense of unity
existed. Clearly, there was no mystiery to the SADCC I s
.iI -----_.--------------- -----~~--
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unifying power. Although its membershad differences
about their ~conomicrelations with South Africa, all
the member states identified apartheic:i as a common
enemythat had to 1:,.edestroyed. However, it has to be
admitted that som~countries had no chol~e other than
to continue economic co-operation with SCJth Africa.
The ties which the former colonies had established
with that country made it impossible to reject co-
opez-at.Lon without disastrous consequences for their
economies.
It was in tl;is same spirit that Malawi, Lesotho and.
Botswana ref'used to comply fully wit'l the UNSecurity
Council's call for mandatoxy sanctions against South
Africa. Malawi and Lesotho were the two countries
that maintained official diplomatic missions in South
Africa. Justifying its position, President Banda of
Malawi said that "trading with South Af~~ca does not
mean 1·1alawisupports apartheid but (,nE! has to be
realistic, for South Africa is here to stay and it is
the most powerful country in Africa, industrially I
economically, financially and the most militarily
powerful. (17)
Fundamentally the SADCCsymbolised the desire of the
member states to liberate themsE~~'resfrom South
Africa's stranglehold. But interdependence amongthe
SADCCstates, and the quantification of economic links
showed that it did not match the core position of
South Africa's economyin the region.
d. The creation of a sens@of commonidentity
The SADCChas contributed considerably to the creat~on
of a regional southern African identity, 'a sense of
commondestiny', as well as a viable platform for
harmonious political and economic relations in the
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region, South Africa included. Despite its commitment
to fighting apartheid, the SADCC has followed a modus
operandi and pragma~ic policies vis a vis South
Africa. Co-operation with South Africa was not
prohibited to member states in areas deemed to be of
national ip~erest.
For the people within the SADe.:..itself, the main
success has been the growing contact that came from
regular technical and ministerial meetings.. These
meetings were important in that members were:growing
to know and trust each other. RegioJ"lalco-operation
was becoming part of their way of thinking. It
succeeded in building confidence. The common identity
is a very important factor for future economic
integration.
e. SAQCC and the call for sanctions.
The acid test of opposition to apartheid was the issue
of sanctions by the international community. liTo
fight for sanctions was the touchstone of genuine
solidarity with the liberation struggle. To resist
sanctions was to support apartheid". (:'9)
Two camps WAre in existence, one wap' supporting the
implementation of mandatory sanctions against South
Africa and the other was against their implementation.
The purpose of sanctions for those who supported them
(the SADCC included) was to isolate South Africa's
apartheid regime. Sanctions were about; cutting the
lifelines of the apartheid system -to the outside
world I they were recognised as complementary to the
liberation struggle. As such they were 'truly a vital
part of the fight against apartheid. This camp argued
that sanctions were a useful tool of statecraft
- ~-~- ~ - ---~-~~---~--~-~~-
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because they allowed pressure to be exerted on a
recalcitrant regime without resorting to force.
sanctions provided the last hope for peaceful
change. (19) The SADCCwas part of this line of thought.
The arguments against sanctions [ coming mostly froTI'1
United states President Ronald Reagan and British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, were that sanctions
would not succeert in changing government policy in
South Africa. In fact I sanctions would hur+ the
majority of the population in South Africa. Reagan's
posture on sanctions was in line with his policy of
constructive engagement.
Another powerful argument advanced against sanctions
was that they would sei,..l.ous;ly hurt the SADCC
countries. This argument rested upon two premises:
the first was that sanctions against .I3.outhAfrica
would have adverse effects on the trontlirie states due
to the process of economic logic that most of the
SADCCstates are economically linked to South Africa.
The second was that South Africa had the capacity to
transfer most of the impact of sanctions onto the
neighbouring states through the application of
counter-sanctions and destabilisation activities.
i
I
~
Whatwas interesting to notice was the firm position
of the SADCCin favour of sanctions. The SADCC,
despite the above quite valid ar'qumerrt.s, made it clear
that any 1,roblemsexperienced by its memberstates due
to sanctions were considered an investment in ending
the far more serious problems of Pretoria's
destabilisation act Iv.i.ties. Economicrelations in the
region and particularly the dependence issue became
the key strategic focus in the campaign to isolate
South Africa.
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For the SADCC the question of South Africa's counter-
sanctions represented the classic concession to
blackmail, that the ability of Pretoria to hold its
neighbours' economies to ransom was sufficient, reason
to hold off and permit it to dictate terms.
The SADCC accepted the negative effects of sanctions
but maintained that "it is true that sanct.Loris tiill
hurt us, but if it accelerated the end of apartheid,
it would be well worth the additional cost. And those
who are concerned about the negative eff~cts of
sanctions on us, should provide assistance". (20)
Despite the mid-80s policy of sanctions, the European
Community (EC) endorsed a policy Characterised by a
strong dichotomy: the po~iticRl condemnation of
apartheid had to be combined with cc tinuance of
economic ties with soutn Africa. This dichotomy posed
a question 011 the nature of the EC policy: "genuine
repugnance for the system of apartheid or a real
politic concern with economic interests and mineral
dependency? If(21)
The EC/s dependency on South African minerals was ~
subject of great debate during the sanction years.
For in spite of the condemnation of apartheid, it was,
not worthwhile for the EC member states to interrupt
their long-standing links with pretoria. As Martin
Holland remarks "the often-cited essential interest
for BC maintaining relations with South Africa is its
position as a leading supplier of specific
minerals,,(22),as shown in Table 3.5.
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TABLE 3 w 5: MAIN E ~c. IMPORTS OF
SOUTH AFRICAN PRODUC~S, 1985
Gold Diamonds
Metal ores
Minerals Coal Iron and steel
Fruit and Vegetables
~'Jool, Animal hairs
Copper Chemicals
Ferro-allo:',.s
Krugerrands
Source: Information (~, -,~hflngesbetween South Africa and
the EEC, Dl:t.'ect'.orat.eGen ral I, EEe Commission
(in Holland, ECP, p,56).
Because of sanctions, data between 1986-1991 do not
contain detailed trade statistics, hence information
on trade is incomplete and unreliable. Availabl'9
figures do not refer. to SOuth Africa only f as they
include the BLS grouping and, before its independence,
Namibia. As a result, a number of factors, including
srri.pmerrt.s through third countries, make it. d i.f f i.cnl.t;
to qi.lart·::i~ythe extent of the sc ,th African trade
exchanqe wi·th Eu'Cope.
It is not easy to assess the impact of economic
sanctions on apartheid. Nevertheless, they were a
very Lmpo; tant factor alongside others; SADCC
regional p~licy 1 internal revolts and negotiations
,
between the government and the' other political
parties, that were instrumental in bringing about the
destruction of apartheid.
f. SADCC and its self-evaluation
The SADCC proved flexible enough to critically
evaluate and readjust its programme of action and its
own approach , A case in point was the re-programming
of the Lusaka Programme of Action in 1987 by de-
emphasising the infrastructural sector in favour of
investment for production.
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By 1986, the SADCC's leaders felt confident that
transport and ccmnurn.cat.Lon1 energy and agriC!ul ture
were well enough organised. The group tihen had a
major r eozqani set.Lcn of priorities. Transport \l7aS
seen as bas i.c to all other aspects of development.
Once transport LJ.pgrading was 1.l'1deTway, the next
priority obviously had to be production of goods Cind
the SADCC's theme in 1987 was 'investillent in
production I. This ambzaoed both direct investment in
production, industry, and improving trade mechanisms
to d.-;velop the regional market r thus entailing a
change in orientation, and more emphasis was put on
what SADCCcaJ led thC:1'e:.1terprise sector'.
Other examples refer to ti"l.e inclusion of private
enterprise in the SADCCp.ffort, e.g. ±he Beira
cor. idor Group (BCG). Another outstanding achievement
in this regard is the recent transform~:tion of the
SADCCitself into the SADCas a way to prepare for the
membership of a non-racial South Africa and to change
the focus of the organisation. The flexibil.i ty of the
SADCCin adapting to a new ::;ituation is evidenced
here. The change of its name also led to a
considerable change in policy (discussed in detail in
Chapters IV and V) and a move towards integration I
which the SADCCoriginally had avoi ded (also discussed
in Chapters IV and V).
2. Failures
The success in the previous areas should, however, not
obscure the lack of.progress in other sectors.
a. Reduction of economic dependence.
The SADCCsuccessfully reduced its dependence on South
Africa in transport. However, it failed to ao so as
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far as trade was concerned. The SADCChas not been
successful in reducing its dependency on south Africa,
instead "trade with S( 'th Africa has been increasing
steadily during the years". (2~) South Africa remained
its biggest trading partner. In analysing inter-
dependence amongthe countries of southern Africa, the
quantification of economic links show that although
the SADCCwas promoting regional projects I and was
reinforcing national economies, it did not match the
core position of south Africa's economyin the region.
'rhere had been very little change since t.he advent of
the SADCCin the proportion of SADCCexports and
imports vis it vis Sou·th Africa. since 1990,
indications are that their trade \'d th South Africa was
actually riSing considerably (See Tables 4.1, 5.2 and
5.3). In 1988, South Africa received only! percent
of the combined exports of the SADceoountrrLes, but
supplied 30 percent of their i]Uports. (24)
Consequently, the intra-qADCe trade has been very low,
standing at some 5 percent Qf total trade, 80 percent
of which is attributable to Zimbabwealone. (25)
The pattern of increased dependence reinforced the
reality that although SADeestates were committed to
regional co-oporation, the realities of the economyof
the region allowed them to work co-,Operati vely with
the apartheid regime.
It was unrAl~':"istic for the SADceto think that trade
relations between its members could be expanded or
contracted virtually at will in pursuit of political
or strategiq objectives. The SADce's failure both to
decrease economic dependence on south Africa and
increase trade between its member states is not
surprising. The policy followed by the SADCCof
allowing each country to be responsible for the co-
ordinat.i.o11of one sector of the Conference's Programme
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of Action has proved to be largely ineffective as
failure to priori tise projects hampered atrcempt.sat
self-sufficiency. (H)
The SADCC's inability to create substantive new
infrastructures and institutions for fostering cross-
border exchange relations was reflected in the
weakness of its efforts to effect changes in economic
relations in the region. Indeed, ":::;ADCCwas not; a
homoqeneous region and like all regional economic
organisations; the more developed ones tend to:benefit
more than the less developed membez'!' , (:m Zimbabwe, for
example, was more interested in the manufacturing and
industrial sector where it was the most developed and
where it could deri',e more benefits. other Ca1.1seScan
be identified as contributing to the SADCC's failure
to increase trade between its member-s and to uplift
the standard of living of its people.
The causes of the failure to reduce dependency on the
RSA and increase trade b~tween SADCC member states are
many:
South Afric~n destabilisation
The first chapter aealt with the ,issue of desta-
bilisation policy in depth. Undoubtedly, this policy
was real and very serious. It must be taken into
uccount. The whole question of security resulted in
importers and exporters being reluctant to USu the
Mozambique routes except for n.on-perishables and non-
eS,sential goods, as well as havi.nq an effect of
slowing down the level of private capital invest.ment
in the region. (213)
I
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SADCCmemberstates~ internal factors
There has been conside~able blurring of the reality.
It is not SUfficient to attribute the anomalous
dynamics of the intraregional economic relations only
to the cont:rast with South Africa. Indeed, it is
apparent that the estimates of the cosrcs attributable
to South Africa's destabilisation activities in the
region ignore the key factors which determine economic
performance in any country I namely the nat.ur'e and
efficacy of domestic policies of resou~ce allocation
and economic management. The SADCCregion is huge and
South Africa's destabilisation policy affected only
restricted areas.
Although Mozal:lbigueand Angola suffered dreadfully
from the destabilisation policy, the other se\ -n
states were generally unaffected. This .judgement is
borne out by ZirnbabtV'eI s agr Lcuttural . per£'ormance
during the first five years following its
independence. DUring this period Zimbabwewas almost
self-sufficient in producing the basic food crops
affordable by the poor. (29) The unprecedented gains
caused University of ZimbabweProfessor A.M. Hawkins
to issue a warning in 1985 that communal and
commercial agriculture was producing too much :maize
for the needs of the country. (30)
While the Zimbabwean government avoided the
agriculture crisis affecting most of Africa and
successfully took on t.he role of providing regional
food secur-Lt.y, the courrtry produced a more reliable
grain harvest ..han South Africa. (31)
r
I"
Internal factors which contributed to poor economic
performance can be identified as:
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bad governance: most of the independent
governments followed badly conceived and executed
economic policies and there was corruption. The
southern Africar. Jandscape is strewn with failed
projects, inappropriate
and factories operating
of suitable inputs.
technology in disrepair,
at low capacity for lack
The earlier advice of
international agencies and other aid donors,
which have been involved in the region for almost
three decades, is also partly responsib~e.
de-industrialisation: the southern ~African
political landscape is strewn with failed
projects, inappropriate technology in disrepair,
and factories operating at a low cepacd ty for
lack of suitable inputs.
high population growth rates, \']hichoutstripped
economic growth and severely stress~d available
resources.
At its 1995 Consul~ative Conference held in Malawi,
the SADC emphasised that in order to promote regional
integration, it is necessary
to create measures that include the
removal of existing political and
economic barriers; macro-economic
converqence and stability; poverty
alleviation; stimUlation of the
private sect.or, convertibility'of SADC
currencies, the establishment of a new
sector on politic, democracy andse.curity .(32)
----- -- ------ ----
structural reform programmes were also undertaken by
most of the SADCC members states during the second
half of the 1980s (Angola, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Tanzania, zimbabwe). (33) Some of them were
backed by the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund (X .lvI.F.) and bilateral donor support. While
these adjustment programmes generally contributed to
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a bet'ter macroeconomic performance of the economies
concerned, they have considerably worsened or even
d~stabilised the social situationp especially of the
urban population ir member countries, thus creating
new political and economic problems and sources of
conflict.
TABLE 3.6: ..,vERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH IN REAL GOP, SADCC
COUNTRIES, 1980-1991.
World market events.
COUNTRIES % P.A.
Angola nla
Bot:swana 9.3 --Lescltho 2.7-
Malawi 3.5
Mozambique -1.1
Namibia 1.6
swa'zi.land 6.8.. -
Tam.ania 2.0'
Zambia 0.7
zimbabwe 3.6
Source~ Norld Bank, 199~.
'rhe>changes taking place in southern Africa are
responsi ve to a context of global interdependence ~'1d
interaction. NO matter what the original intentions
of these changes, it is difficult to isolate regional
deliberations from their context of global economic
and political dependence.
In one of its reports, the SADCC noted that since it
was founded in 1980, it operated in an unfavourable
world economic environment. This global economic
environment has played a significant role in worsening
70
the economic performance of the SADCC member states. (34)
Exanlination of trading patterns serves to confirm and
el.aboratethis view. The countries of southern Africa
have been locked into the role of primary product
exporters. As such, they have been severely affected
by the transition from global expansion ·torecession 1
weakening the demand for primary commodities. Adverse
terms of trade, a heavy debt burden and growing
protection in Western countries have all served to
constrict gdlns reaped from international tratie.
For an organisation dedicated to self-reliance and the
reduction of econolnic dependence on South Africa, the
existence of established trading connections as well
as commitnl!:'!ntsand obligations wtthin other
arrangements by S.\OCCmembers presented allimpediment
to SADCC trade co-operation. with the exception of
Botswana, all SADCC membArs also belong to the common
Market for Easterrl and Southern Africa (COMESA).
Others are members of SACU. The SADCC adopted a
programme of regional co-operation which was in many
respects different from those of both the PTA and
SACU.
The multi-membership of the
illustrated the inadequacy of
SADCC countries
its institutional
framework for effective co-ordination and
harnonf sa+Lon of trade policies. The impact of the
interactions between the orga~isations forced the
"SADCC countries to operate different trade
regimes" .(~5)
Because of this state of affairs, it was technically
incorrect to speak of separate, mutually exclusive,
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regional organisations in southern Africa. A PTA
document issued in December 1992, lists the following
common objectives with the SADC: facilitation of the
restructuring of industries and the realization of
economies of scale through the establishment of a
single market.
Unlike the SADCC, the PTA emphasises a regional
approach to economic J..ntegrationand its programmes
are based on supranational institutions with a
capacity for regional co-ordination. As the;markets
of the SADCC were opened to all PT}~ members, SADCC-
sponsored projects had to compeb9 with projects
throughout the region. Given the sharp ly uneven
levels of industrialisation, non-discriminatory trade
liberalisation was benefiting the strongest members
(Zimbabwe, Kenya), contradicting the SADCC's
commitment to balanced development and the reduction
of inegualities. For example, a disproportionat:e
share of the region's new industries preferred to
locate in zimbabwe. So far, this is a problem with
free trade areas in Africa, and the new SADC will not
escape this if appropriates rule$ of co-operation are
not implemented.
Another example relating to the deter~oration of trade
relations between the SADCC countries I as a
consequence of their dual membership, is the one which
involves Malawi and Zimbabwe. Since the establisl~ment
of the PTA, Malawi's exports to Zimbabwe have declined
dramatically. The situa.tion is associated with the
fact that the PTA tre~ty charter states that no
country may get more favourable trade terms than those
accorded to member states.
A number of bilateral agreements existed between the
SADe countries. With the exception of the Botswana-
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Zimbabwe agreement, these lapsed when the PTA's
initial round of tariff reductions came into effect in
1984. If these agreements had been maintained, the
countries would have complied with the provision of
the PTA treaty and grant most f.avoured nation
treat.ment to imports from all other PTA countries.
The establishment of the PTA meant that the free
trade area which exited between Zambia and Zimbabwe
and Malawi became a preferential trade area, a
retrogression in ·terms of economic integration.
The consequence of Malawi joining the PTA was that its
Open General IMport Licensing (OGIL) agreemem: with
Zimbabwe was ended. The termination was against the
principle of SADCC trade development based on the
promotion of bilateral ~greements between member
states. The PTA has emerged as a hindrance to SADCC
intra-rE~gional trade.
This clarification of the existing situation is
important in the sense that it exposes the failure by
the SAuCC to recognise the contradiction inherent in
the existence of established trading connections, as
well as commitments, obligations and incentives of its
members within other trading blocs.
c. Dependence on foreign f~nds.
It \qas an achievement to have convinced the
industrialised countries to finance the SADCC's
projects. The international community was genuine and
ge~erous, both in its political and material support
for the SADCC. It may be stated at this point that
support as mentioned, mainly from Western countries,
conflicted with the tenets of the Lusaka Declaration.
Firstly, it was contrary to the objective of a
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lessening of dependence mainly on western economies.
The over-reliance on foreign aid meant that donors
were bound to have a considerable influence on the
SADCC's projects and policy formulation. Donor
influence was not inherently negative; it promoted
the adoption of more appropriate polic:ies; but it
implied that the SADCC, to a large extent, formulated
its projects on the basis of what the donors were
willing to support. The donors had, through their
control of the purse I the power to veto. consequently
the SADC recognises that long-term development of the
region cannot be planned on the basis of aid. There
is a need to promote the mobilisation of local
resources. (36)
Secor-dIy, it cOl)tributed t.o the failure in
implementation of mechanisms for the mobilisation of
the SADCC's own resources. Perhaos the .~nability to
mobilise the region's own financial re$ourccs for
development has been its greatest failure. (37) Besides,
this dependence led to increasing the foreign debt
problem of member states. Further, a lack of
management proficiency has also been evident when
viewed in conjunction with a lack of financial
:resources.
with foreign funding accounting fo~ 80-90 percent of
total project costs on averaqe , the sustainability of
SADCC projects in the long-term has come into doubt
with member governments being unable to meet either
the local currency capital or recurrent costs of
projects implemented. As a result many projects l.~ve
either not oeen completed or have not been
sufficiently well-maintained to justify the initial
investment. The mobilisation of the region's own
resources for development is one of the central
objectives, as well as policies, for effective and
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self-sustaining regional development. It will require
appropriate policies to be formulated, and effective
insti tutions and procedures to be put in place. (38)
TABLE 3.7: TarAt EXTERHlL DEBT OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 1984/6; 1989; 1990 (US $ MILLION)
roUHTRY
Angola
1984
1024
1985--+--_19_8~:_:~t_~_989 _ _L 199() 1:=
1403 3071 6950 ~ -
Botswana **395 363 358 510 516
Lesotho 142 173 186 320 399 **
*Malawi 898 994 1193 1390 1544 '
*Mozambique 4718
South Africa
1231-+-------~-------+------~~-------+-------~I1442 3156 4740
20600
Namibia **
swaziland 253 276 232 2~0
Tanzania 3047 3374 3955 4920 5866 *
**Zimbabwe 2030 2119 2480 6870 3199
Zambia
Total
3933
12953
* Severely indebted
** Less Indebted
14640
5299
19850
6870
49670
'1.,""f.-~4.)
Source: SADCC External Debt stygy, 1989, and World Development Bank~ort, 1991 and 1992 •
..
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TABLE :3.8: TOTAL EXTERNALDEBT RATIOS, 1980 AND 1991
Total erbrnaJ. Debt service as concessional debt Multilateral debt
debt 3S a \ of a ~ of exports as t of total as t of total
GBP erternal debt erternal debt
Countly 1980 1991 1980 1991 1980 1991 1980 1991
Angola , • • I ft I 11 A12
Botswana 14.8 15.7 1.9 3.4 46.6 4u.3 63.3 71.4
Lesotho 11.2 39.5 1.5 4.6 61.0 77.0 55.3 72.9
Malawi 71.1 78.5 27.7 25.0 33.8 76.8 26.7 71.5
Hozalblque 0.0 42t..~ 0.0 10.6 0.0 59.7 0.0 12.0
Hmbia ft • I R I R • R
SWaziland I w B W II ft • •
Tanzania 48.3 250.8 19.6 24.6 55.3 60.0 21.4 30.5 IZallbia 90.7 • 25.3 50.3 25.4 35.9 12.2 20.9~- .,
Zillbabwe 14.9 57.0 3.8 27.2 2.3 29.1 0.4 21.2
• not available
Sou:roo: stephanie Baile and Horst Breier I ATy,rning-point for Southern Mtica, In the OEeD Observer
1994, p.24.
SUMMARY
The great railways, ports and roads of the,SADCC region,
linking its peoples and transporting its' products I have
been crucial to the SADCC. The challenge for the region
was not so much to create as to rehabilitate the roads,
railways and ports battered by the wars, South African
destabilisation policy, poor management and neglect. Fer
the SADCC, without the establishment of adequate regional
transport and communication systems, all other areas of co-
operation were impossible. It is, therefore 1 the intention
of this chapter to assess the SADCC, its successes and
failures.
The restoration of an almost defunct but potentially
invaluable regional infrastructure has been the most
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successful achievement of this organisation. The grouping
has attracted attention and more importantly, funding. The
SADCCmanaged to raise 40 percent of the financial aid it
sought for the main transport system to the ports of Beira,
Nacala and Lobito. (39) This was definitely an achievement
for the region ~n a oontext of diminishing aid elsewhere.
Nevertheless, one must acknowledge that ~he SADCCis
unlikely to be recorded by pos·teri ty as a resounding
success. Indeed I despi t~ these achievements, the SA.DCC
failed to address an important factor of the pc.l.L tical
economy of the :CE'gion! the increase of intra-regional
trade among its member states. The discussion above shows
that there are a number of causes other than south African
destabilisation acti vi ties for the poor economic growth
performance of some SADCCcountries.
with the end of apartheid and South Africa becoming the
eleventh member of the Southern African .. Development
community (SADe), the conditions for the Community/s common
front against apartheid South Africa has disappeared. i'1hat
are the implications, regional and international, of this
change? This question will constitute the focus of
discussion of the next rhapter.
II •
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CHAPTER IV
I M P L I ~A T ION S
DEMOCRATISATION
OF THE PROCEU QF
J' H ..=E,----=R,E G ION A_I.
IN SOUTH .AE_RI_C_A_.
IN'l"RODIJCTION
This chapter deals with the implications of South ~frica/s
transi tion from a minori ty to a melj.;rity system of
governance on the old regional poli tica 1 economy, The
impact of domestic processes in South Africa hes affected
the soc Lc-poIitical economy relationships of the region I
dominated by strategic issues (military/defence and
destabilisation) and the politics of isolation (the SADCC
~olithout .south Africa). 'Jlherefore,two important questions
which der! VEl from the past economic relationsl1,ipare to be
addressed. will South Africa really change, or will it
continue with interference, destabilj sat.Lon and economic
dominance? Or will the region be able to shake cff the
heritage of many years of attempts actively to discourage
interaction and isolate itself from south Africa? The
international community role for political stability and
economic development in the region will also be examined.
South Africa's progress to political democracy that
commenced on 2 February 1990 has raised the hopes of
millions of people on the continent, particularly that
a post-apartheid South Africa might be able to
contribute to the development of the region. Nearly
:LOO million people outside south Africa were directly
and adversely affected by the policies of the
apartheid government. They now anticipate the positive
}... FROM C_PN:Fj.{....0N~ATIONTO DIALOGUE.
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prospects of economic reform and economic development
in south Africa itself.
The rise to power of P.W. de Klerk in 1989 coincided
with the end of South Africa's policy of
destabilisation and the dismantling of apartheid.
Attention shifted from conflicting political and
economic relations towards transition, reconstruction,
and speculation about the possible impact on the
political and economic situation in Southern Africa of
new policies in South Africa.
The changes taking place in South Africa have been
significant and positive from the standpoint of peace
and regional security. Peace and security are pre-
requisites for national development, as well a~ deeper
regional co-operation and integration.
The South African policy of destabilisation led in tho
past. toosupport for UNITA in its war aqai.nst;the I.fPLA
hi ~ngola. In Namibia, it led to an LrrcensLrLcatifon
of the colonial war against the South west African
People I s organisation (SWAPO); it led South.Africa to
support RRNAMO in its effort to topple the government
of Mozambique. Destabilisation was an aggressive
counter-offensi ve to maintain apartiheLd f minor! ty rule
domestically and to sustain south Africa's regional
economic and political hegemony.
The direct consequence of this destabilisation has
been the way in which southern Africa has incurred
huge military expenditure and joi~ed in the arms race
in an attempt to alleviate security concerns.
Military expenditure rose substantially
across the region, and in the most
extreme cases, Angola and Mozambique,
were absorbing as much as 40% of total
state expenditure by the end of the
1980'r.1
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Twomain reaso:ns can be identified for this influx of
arms. Regional threats: civil wars and a powerful
neighbour, south Africa and, an international threat
of the superpower confrontation. These two trends
were interlinked.
It has become evident that in the states of southern
Africa, notably South Africa, Angola and Mozambique,
instabili ty was rooted in indigenous phenomena that
were quite different from external interferences. The
combination of indigenous and exogenous sources of
instability during the Cold War era created a
si tuation of insecurity described as relative weakness
arising from the lack of autonomy, vulnerability and
the lack of room for manoeuvre a:Eflicting the Third
Worle'!states on economic, pc,litical and of course,
military levels. (2) As long as the Cold War bi-polar
international order persisted, the two. majo.r world
powers (soviet union and united states) could be
relied upon automatically to take opposing sides in
Third World conflicts. (3)
This confrontation of superpower ideologies manifested
itself in Southern Africa. On the one hand, the USSR
emerged in the 1970S and 1980s as chief supplier of
armaments to revolutionary regimes,.in Angola and
Mozambique. The massive communist'armE build-up in
the region was accompanied by an influx of Easte:rn
Bloc military advisers and thousands of Cuban soldiers
acting as proxies for Moscow.(4)
~)
On the other hand, South Africa and the United states
backed the rebels in Mozambique (Renamo) and
especially unita in Angola, with both covert and overt
military assistance.
I
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The transfer of conflict was accompanied by the
transfer of sophisticated weaponry. It can be argued
that there was a direct relationship between the end
of the Cold War and the dismantling of apartheid in
South Africa. Indeed, the preference for peaceful
resolution of conflicts in southern Africa is a direct
resul t of the demise of the Cold War. The end of both
the Cold War and apartheid now bind South Africa more
closely to the rest of southern Africa, which in the
past aimed at reducing its dependence on that ~ountry.
There can be little doubt that the current and future
challenge to economic development and well-being in
the southern African region is to recover from the
economic destruction, social instability and physical
dislocation and human suffering caused by more than
fifteen years of so-called "low-intensity" conflicts
fostered by South African destabilisation policy. (5)
Today, the collapse of apartheid has precipitated the
cessation of South African-sponsored military and
economic destabilisation in the region. (6) without
apartheid, th.e basic raison d'etre for destabilising
action has disappeared. Internal actors have now
emerged as leaders in the resolution of national
conflicts. (7)
south Africa's disengagement from regional conflicts,
as well as that of the superpowers, "leaves the way
open for local initiatives to fill the power vacuum
with agreed arrangements". (e) This paved the way for
the independence of Namibia in March 1990 and
favourably influenced the geo-political situation in. .
other countries: prospects for peace in Angola, the
holding of the first democratic elections in
Mozambique and South Africa, under new dispensations
\,it:h governments of national unity. The political
situati0:;~ in these countries, with antagonistic
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parties working together, shows that "politics is now
much more in command than strategy". (9) It also means
that regional organisations that had been formed in
support of the struggle, the Frontline states Grouping
(FLS) and the SADCC had to re-examine their objectives
and find new reasons for their existence. with the
inauguration of Presi~ent Mandela in May 1994, the FLS
virtually ceased to exist. New efforts are afoot to
replace the grouping with the Association of Southern
African States (ASAS) whose objective would be
conflict resolution and security co-ordina~ion in
Southern Africa.
Although the formation of this new grouping has been
agreed to in principle I problems abound as to its
implementation. T~e SADC meeting of August 1995 in
Johannesburg failed to formulate the operational
a ',-:ectsof the ASAS because of"differing of priorities..
bet.ween sou+h Africa and the other SADC membar stiR:tes.
At t.he height of apartheid and destabilisation soutrr
Africa pushed its neighbours to enter into security
agreements as a means of cutting off support for the
liberation movements (Nkomati Accord with Mozambique
in 1984). With the political changes, "South Africa
is pushing for regional security arxanqement.s as a
weans of stemming the floW of illegal immigrants into
South Africa,,(lO),curtailing growing smuggling of drugs
and arms and, as a means of enhancing its image as the
regional peacekeeper.
I)
Unlike the past, when relations between South Africa
and neighbouring states were characterised by mutual
SUSPl.ClOl'l, when each side salj~ its security and
stability as being threatened by the other, when each
side perceive~ itself as the target for
destabilisation by the other, the new trend of
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resolving problems between countries relies upon th~
politics of dialogue. The moving of the region from
an era of conflict to one of peace I stabLi.ity and
security is a very positive feature resulting from the
end of apartheid. This has created favourable
conditions for victims of destabilisation to secure a
negotiated end to various conflicts in the region.
But it is not clear what possibilities it offers for
the reconstruction of the r~gionrs economy through
co-operation between its states.
B. INCREASE IN CO-OPER~TION: INTERDEPENDENCE OR DEPEN-
DENCY.
Despite the restriction resulting from the past
political policies, "South Africa has. had close
economic ties with most of the Southern African
region II(1:1) through bi-lateral trade agreements with
Malavli,Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and through the SACU
with Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. These
economic relations have been said to be asymmetric I
with South Africa receiving most of the benefits.
Indeed, South Africa commands an economy three times
the size of the rest of SADC economies combined.
with the new political dispensation ~n South Af::.ica,
the factors which were instrumental in diminishing
economic co-operation in the region have disappeared
(apartheid and destabilisation). The main question
now is whether the SADC and South Africa are going to
take their cue from the theories of complex
interdependence ~ather than political realism in
confronting tllenew operational environment opening up
before them?
Three views have emerged since the process of change
began in South Africa as to how the economic
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relationship has been affected by these changes.
1. pouth Africa as a power hous~.
This viewpoint presents South Africa as a saviour that
is going to resolve the SADe's economic problems. The
idea is very much alive in some groups in the
international commund ty . 'I'he conception rests upon
the be~.ief that South Africa is a IIregional power". As
the region I s most prosperous economy it can be a
condui t for investment and a provider of gQods and
services to the rest of the region. Undoubtedly,
South Africa has a relatively well-established
infrastructure and technology which the region needs
for its development.
The l::asis for focusing on South Africa is easi ly
explained by the information in Table 4.1. I which
presents some recent statistics about populations,
size I and income levels in the eleven southern African
states.
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~-- - _.
coomy 1U! PCPUU'fiOl GDP GDP PER
(1000 02) (HILLIOliS) (BILLIOI 05$) ClPIf!
(US$)
Angola 1247 10,0 3.5 350
___.;;..
Botswana 600 1.3 3.6 2530
r-'
Lasotbo 30 1.8 0.6 580
Malawi 118 8.8 2.0 230
MozaJbique 802 16.J. 1.2 80
llalibia 827 1.5 2.0 I 1460-
Swaziland 17 0.8 G.S 1050
f-----
Tanzania 945 25.2 2.2 100
Zambia 753 8.3 3.8 450
Zilbabwe 391 10.1 5.5 650
TOUL 5727 93.9 25.2 2850
South Africa 1221 38.9 90.2 .. 2560
soutaem Africa 6948 132.8 116.4 950
SUb-Saharan Africa 24,287 527.8 255.5 350 I
including South Africa
SOuth Afrk.a \ of Southern 18\ 29\ 78\ 2.7 tiles
Africa
3 .. 7.3 tiles.I'll
Sub-Saharan Africa 7\ 5%
H.B. south Africa's sbare of Sub-Saharan Africa is: ,
35-40% of Merchandise export~
40-45% of Hanufacturing GOP
55-60% ~f COllercial energy consUlption
·2 ====-=
Source: Xhe World Bank. World Devel(ll)lentReport, 1993.
i)
South Africa with less than 30% of the population, has
more than three-quarters of the GDP originating in the
region. South Africa also dominates the rest of sub-
Saharan Africa; accounting for over a third of the
continent's merchandise exports, over 40 percent of
its GDP and manufacturing export and over 50 percent
of its commercial energy consumption.
89
Given South Africais relative financial strength, it
is in a position to borrow long-term in international
markets, to permit or encourage long-term capital
flo~'JI and to use some portion of such capital to
finance trade within the region. This could provide
finance for growing trade, and 'therefore growing
incomes, not only in South Africa, but also in the
other countries of the region.
Another idea behind the power house concept concerns
a mora].issue. The SADe states have actively assisted
black South Africans to liberate themselves from
decades of domination by whites, at considerable cost
to themselves, and they expect the new South Africa to
recompense them. In such circumstances the ANC-led
government will be called upon "to rep"lYpast. favours
given to the ANC by the frontline states over the past
few decades". (l.:2) It may be said that so.~th Africa I s
stance on assisting the Southern Africrul states in
their efforts to promo'ce economic development is
likely to be influenced by 'the new government's view
of th~ historical and moral commi.tment to the front
line states. This has to be described as being
simplistic and idealistic in the way it presents
future economic relations in the region. Firstly, it
ignores the economic legacy of apa;rtheid in South
Africa. Secon~lYI it undermines factor.s which
influence economic relations between states, such as
national interest, the ability to he-Lp, and
interdependence between states.
2. South Africa as a dominant economic power.
Followers of this view recognise that South Africa is
the regional sup-rr power. From this perspective,
South Africa will continue to dominat.e the region
economically and t.ho new government might not be a
Disregarding South Africa's enormous economic
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more generous neighbour than the old. In the event of
such a development, t.he regional states would have to
deal with an inward looking South Africa and the
ensuing possibility of having to absorb policies
unfavourable to t.hem, They might f moreovs-»I find
themselves as more or Les.s helpless recipiE>.1ts of the
secondary effects of domestic policy changes in South
Africa.
Two factors wj11 contribute to South. Africa I s
willingness to dor.•inate other states in the region.
Firstly, its need to resolve internal problems;
secondly, its own national economIc interests.
a. Factors which will influenc~ South Africa's
domination.
a1 South Africa's int~rnal problems
There is a growing fear in th€ region that pressure on
tile government to implemant its Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP) will divert its attention
from regional problems. contrary to the tenets of t.ho
Power House concept, the inability 1:.0 resolve its
internal problems will make a post-apartheid South
Africa a likely net ..:ecipient of a;Ld rather than a
benevolent donor.
problems, the SADCactually believes that the country
will replace the organisation's increasingly reI ur ..tant
overseas donors. 'l'he. Arusha summit o~ 26 August '91,
for exanp.Le, agreed that a post-apartheid South Africa
would be expeot.ed to "fiD the role of present co-
operating partners through the provi s ron of Lnvestment;
capital to BADe member s+at.es ", (13)
.-----~-~ ---~--~-
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'Ihe presumption that south Africa maybe beneficent to
its neighbours rests upon a long-terrr. expectation. In
the short-' erm, the newgovernment will conc-errt.rat.e on
its RDP.
South Africa will be inwd.rd~looking as
the result of the domestic economic
challenges it will face and it will
therefore pay little serious attention
to the problems of the region. (14)
In this view SOl.l'thAfrica 't-lill act in its own'narrowly
def Lncd interests, wh:'ch may include e~~p..loiting
markets in the region. The democratic South Af:t'ica
will be p.ceoocupi.ed with its int.ernal problems and
will not playa significant role In promoting growth
in t:!-J.eregion.
Measurdd against itA neighbours, south.~frica looks
like a ~ich country with plenty to off~r. Measured
against domestic. expect.at.Lons , south Africa cannot
spare a penny.
The new government is :Likely to pursue the
redistribution of economic power in an attempt to
na::r·ow the economic dispar:Lties between the race
groups. 'I.'hesalient Lasues are guit~ stark. (15)
Unemployment: In the early 1980's the
unemployment rate .(or all south Africans was
estl.hlated to be 21 percent. (16) Today it is much
higher. It ~s notoriously difficult to gather
accurate figures on uric,tployment as t.he flize of
the final figure will depend upon a number of
methodological and conceptual assumptions.
Generally, go~ernm~nt figures seem to
underestimate the mngnitude of the problem. An
added danger is the possibility that any
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improvement in this area might result in the
spectre of millions of migrants flocking to the
relatively greener pastures of the south African
economy.
Poverty: more than 50 percent of wage earners
earn less than the minimum subs ietience levels
that have been calculated(17).
Housing: Critical shortages exist, officially
this is estimated in the region of one nillion
units . The scrapping of the Group Areas Act
might alleviate t.his problem, but onlY to the
extent that. :UE:~-classBlacks would be in a
position to benefit, the actual shortage is more
in terms of low-cost housing tor the poor.
Health: critical shortages of facilities for the
mass of the population exist aLonqs i.de very
sophisticated facilities for a minority.
Education: There is an abysmal ..shortage of
facilities. I~ tho first instance, Black
education in the form of Verwoerdian Bantu
Education constitutes inferior educattu.llJ which
does not prepare Black school children for the
demands of a modern industrialised economy
93 per-cent;of teachers in Black schools are not
fully qualified and in more than 600 schools
double sessions are in operatio:p due to shortage
of cla$'srooms.(18)
The capital and efforts requd.z-ed to solve these
problems will negatively affect the South African
atticude tiowaxds the rest.rl1cturing of the present
economic relations in the region.
~) It is certainly a fallacy to believe that with the new
political dispensation in south Africa, everything in
the region wi;"l change for the better.
towards covert forms of economic
domination. (19)
manipulation and
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A critically important question is how protec~
tionistic I or how outwardly aggressi ve , the .lew
government in South Africa will be. The case of
zimbabwe is illustrative as it has adopted various
economic policies which have
Zambia, Malawi and Botswana.
adversely affected
Zimbabwe abrogated
agreements wit.h its neighbours, dumped its goods on
regional markets, and prevented exports from regional
trading partners from entering the' country. Those
hoping for rapid economic recovery w(~redisappointed.
a2• The nati.onal interest
Because of the preoccupation with internal demands,
South Africa mayhave to orientate its regional policy
io»
The four some countrrLes have of being' economi.ceLlv
dominated by South Africa is understandable in terms
of the following scenario: pressurised to resolve
domestic problems, South Africa could reap most of the
benefits of expanded trade wi.th the rest of Africa and
thereby aggravate the economic problems in her region.
Be that as it may, South Africa will c:ontinue to be
the leading protagonist in t.hat; regiO,11,and ,to a large
extent it will assume the prerogative of writing the
script. (20) 'I'his could imply a patronizing attitude or
domination. Alternatively an outward-looking Sout.h
Africa could aid re<;;ional development I assist with
technology and expertise and be a favourable source of
imports for the c~untries of the region (becaus~ vf
shorter travel distances, ability to provide service) I
and be a captive market (based on economic interest
calculations) for exports from the region.
In other words, a policy driven by considerat:ions of
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trade and economic interest would focus on selling and
buying to the benefit of the South African economy.
The region appears to be a captive market for south
African exports, therefore I considerations such as
building it up into a powerful economic bloc composed
of self-reliant, productive states will not enjoy a
high priority. such a situation will only reinforr<E?
tender.cies to reproduce the existing pat.tiezus of
economic domination and subordination which
characterise South African SADC economic relations.
Under these conditions, trade, labC'lur,and transport
flow will continue to follow the present trend. (.2).)
The extent to which countries of a particular economic
grouping have the political will to accept short-term
sacrifices at home .in the interest of regional
prograss, crucially affects the prospects of good
relations between South Africa and its neighbours.
I)
One could hope that "a \l1on~racial democratic stat.e'
would actively work to promote regional economic co-
operation in ways that would not be exploitative and
would correct imbalances that exist in current rela-
tionships(22)II. As far as co-operation is -soncerned,
there is no fair ;;>layin the international arena. The
pursuit of national interests seems to be the
primordi:al objective. The new South African
government will continue to perceive southern Africa
as an export market, and, at least in the short-term,
will not necessarily be interested in equalising the
existing asymmetrical "trade balances". with South
Africa as the eleventh member of the SADC, it would
"not necessarily follow that one would find a reversal
of accelerated uneven development and marginalisation.
Ji'
Within the SADC itself, regional co-operation bas~d on
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the principle of mutual benefit has yet to become a
factor in strategies for national development. The
reluctance of the SADCcountries to abandon national
projects in favour of cost savings through regional
projects is a testimony to this. Plans for a $300
million strategic regional food reserve, sixteen years
ufter they had been announced in J980, have not yet
overco~e the obstacles raised by national self-
interest. (22)
In 1984, Zambia frustrated the SADC plans to
standardise regional airlines' use of Boeing carriers
by purchasing a DC-I0 aircraft. (;23) Zimbabwe has
restricted imports of cheap Botswana textiles. (24) The
most outstanding example of what, has been termed
"national chauvfnf.sm'' was zimbabweI s disregard for the
electricity surpluses readily available from ZambiaOr
Mozambiquein planning its 'Owngenerating. capac i,ty. (25)
with reference to Presid~nt Mugabe, as well as other
leaders, Hawkins has observed on the ironical fact
that "those whohave spoken loudest and longest about
regional co-operation are those ••• whose domestic
economic policies have contributed so much to the
deterioration of their national economies and whohave
repeatedly put national self-int~rest ahead of
regional links. (26)
~)
The SADChas yet to become art effective Lnstarument; of
econr •."':! transformation and integration I and part of
the daily managementof national affairs as envisaged
by its founders. (27) "Reg~onal co-ope:ration is yet to
become a factor in the policies of memberstates for
national devel.opmerrtr consequently, there is no
synergy and s,':>!(letimesthere is even conflict between
regional programmes and those of memberstates". (211)
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Knowing of the existence of this kind of behaviour
among states of the region, how can one expect South
Africa to behave differently? The SADe maintains that
organisational structures need to be loose and
informal, as facilitating and consequent.i.aI rather
than causative forces or ends in themselves. In this
instance, the SADe's unique character is said to be
defined by its commitment to identifying projects in
the national interest of its member states. In such
circumstances I if South Africa did not have overt
aspirations of domination, a government operating in
a regional environment wnich severely constrained any
possibili ty for socio-economic transformation would be
unlikely to embrace a project of co-operation with
other states co transform existing patterns of
regional ~elations.
As I mentioned earlier, this line of thought argues
thA.t it ~>101.l1dbe a misconception for' At'ricans in
general and southern Africans in particular., to try to
escape from South Africa's economic orbit. The
Republic will remain for the foreseeable future the
economic giant of the region.
There are well-known prescr.iptions for a country
wanting to reduce its economic d,ependence on a
powerful neighbour: "look for other markets, look at
the possibility of increased processing of your export
products, widen the source of your industrial
technologies and look for other means of
deve-Lopment;".(29) Of all these prescriptions, modern
technology is one of the most important de'terminants
of independence.
In the region, South Africa is the highly developed
country. Therefore! problems such as those affecting
technology, communication and trade become more
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complicated. liThemembers of the SADe, particularly
the more industrially advanced - (with the exception
of South Africa) - Zimbabwe, are nervous about being
swamped economically, politically by South Africa. 11(30)
This, in other words, means "even allowing for new
dispensation in South Africa, regional imbalances w~ll
not change overnight". (31)
3. South Africa ~s an equal partner.
In contras·t to the supporters of subor-di.natiestates
systems and their relevance to southern Africa, this
line of thought argues that:
South Africa I s regional hegemony has
limitations and that states within
SADC(C) are both dependent· and
interdependent with South Africa. (3;')
'I'llis approach is shared by those who argue that a
powerful South Africa can be better managed inside
rather than outside the SADC. It is similar to a
familiar argument amongst those who fear Germany
0utside the European Union. I agree with this point
because of its holistic consideration of the region
(in its historical context and also in the context of
the political and economic changes ~t is undergoing,
as well as in the context of the changes in the larger
global environment). The limits on South Africa's
dominance in the region tdll come from two areas:
regional and world economy.
1. Regional limitations
The pattern of dependency of the SADC count:ries on
South Africa takes in the fact that South Africa has
also relatively well-established links of interest in
the region. with the end of apartheid I the balance of
The emergence
unemploymentj
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forces in the region is quantitatively changing
towards the restoration of their natural economic
pattern. Officially, trade interaction between the
SADe countries and South Africa was politically
renounced and actively discouraged. Policies were
structured to boost intra-SADe trade and isolate South
Africa from the sUb-continent. "The sUbstanti.al co-
operation on physical infrastructure provision and
related developments during the fifties and sixtie~,
resulted in 80 percent of the region's trade passing
through the Angola and M07.ambique lines and 20 percent
through South Africa". (33) From the eighties up to now,
south Africa was the channel for about 70 percent of
regional trade. Recent events and developments
promise not simply to end or reverse these long-term
developments, but to lead to a struggle over the
building of new regional relationships.
those of other countries in the region.
of these problems (illiteracy,
It is true that South Africa is differ~nt from the
rest of the ragion with respect to the classical
macro-economj~ indicators, together with the
infrastruc and general logistical facilities it
has. However, its development problems are similar to
homelessness, disease and poverty) as' burning issues
since the process of political change started in South
Africa I has clear' 'T shown that it is also a Third
World country which needs fundamental reforms of its
pol~tical and economic system.
South Africa commands an economy threE~ tj.mes the size
of all other SADe economies combined, and currently
dominates the region. There is a danger of further
economic polarisation, unless countervailing measures
are taken on both sides to ensure that this does not
happen. Two factors will act as a hindrance to the
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pursuit of South African domination in the region.
The first is the willingness expressed by both
parties, South Africa and the SADC, to co-operate as
equal partners. Both sides have reckoned with "the
danger of further economic polarisation, unless
countervailing measures; are taken on both sides to
ensure that this does not happen". (34) The official
attitude of the new ~ uth Africa may perhaps be taken
as that expressed by its President Nelson Mandela, who
is also the President of the ANC:
In forging links with our neighbours,
the ANC will draw on an African
tradition of which we are a part, of
promoting greater continental unity.
We are currently involved in
consultation with the •.• (SADe) ... and
... (PTA) We look forward to a
mutiuaL beneficial association with both
of these important vehicles of
promoting regional prosperity. (35)
These issues can be reconciled with the moral
obligation put upon south Africa to repay the support
of its neighbours in its fight against apartheid.
Because of its problems at home, and the scarcity of
resources to help these countries, South Africa must
be careful to enter only into neqo: ..iated and equal.
',)
beneficial economic co-operation with its SADC states.
The surrounding states have also borne the burden of
apartheid all these years i should they now bear the
burden of the end of apartheid? The liberation
movements, owe the surrounding states a qreat deal,
and this debt should not be paid off with draconian
economic policies.
F'romthe SADC, its position hc:.sbeen expressed in the
following terms: 1
1
I
.\
'.\
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South African membership would have to
be based on principles of equality,
inter-dependence and mutual benefit, as
opposed to dependence anddomination. (36)
This means that any projer:>tthat envisages regional
economic interaction based on some level of agreement
between governments, and which seeks to de more than
confirm South African hegemony, will have to grapple
with the real legacy of destabilisation, its
diff~rential effects on the SADC countries, and their
fears of South African domination.
The scenario of restabilisation of the region could
occur if the SADC member states enter into
negotiations over aspects of regional economic
relations such as trade, investment and labour
migration. (37)
The second factor is the economic interdependence
which characterises the countries of the region.
Southern Africa has always been and still remains an
economically coherent region, it is potentially
capable of benefiting from the motive force of
economic co-operation among its constituent states. (3S)
"
For some years in the late 1980s, the balance of trade
surplus that south Africa ran with its SADC neighbours
amounted to over $7.5 billion per year, which was a
critical factor in its economic survival since the
early 1980s. other important links involved
signi.ficantSouth African investment in at least seven
of the ten SADC countries, even at the height of the
sanctions era. Most of the industrial development in
the SADC countries has been with international
capital, and much of this capital originated from
South Africa.
, \
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The new non-racial democratic order in South Africa
could create at least 'the possibility of the
emergence I of a co+cper-at.Lve project between that
country and the other states of the region, aimed at
transforming the pattern of regional economic
relations created by apartheid.
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Table 4.2 shows that Namibia anc1Angola had no trade
with other SADCcountries. Namibian exports went to
the rest of the world and South Africa, most of its
imports caue from South Africa and the rest of the
world. Angola, on the other hand, traded with the
rest. of the world only. Tanzania had 1i ttle trade
with the SADecountries, it exported barely US$ 1.3
million's worth to the other SADCcountries and
imported in the amount of US$ 12.4 million, mostly
from Zambia and Zimbabwe. These rF.lp.cesent.about 1
percent of its trade.
JI
Ii
~,
I
'rbe movement of goods is mostly between ZimbabweI
BotswanaI Malawiand Zambia. 'rhe reasons for t.'1is are
many and varied: poli tical, economicI infra-
structural, financial. .Any change in these elements
increases the ability of the countries to heighten
their produr+!vi ty and l::5e00meviable membersin future
regional co-op3ration.
Advantages of economic co-operation are substantial in
southern AfriIJa. It requires an in-depth study of
multi-sectional relationships in the region to reveal
this. The potential gains from closer regional co-
operation that individual courrcrLss simply cannot
muster, include the following:
Stable and dynamic efficiency gains from trade
creation and other effects;
economies of scale; especially in infra-
structural investments;
acceLez-aton of oucceaaru'l structural adjustments
t~roughout the region;
greater attractiveness to foreign Lnvas cment.r
greater competitiveness of regional industries;
enhanced revenue administrations through harmoni-
sation of tax regions;
regional welfare gains from the reduc·tion of non-
tariff barriers. (39)
-.~.~. ...-----~----~~ ..---~---...---.------ ..•-..,.,..
can bring. rrhe:re
It will provide
t,E!sothoI end its
are various aspects to this.
an annual cash. income for
dependence on south 7>.fric:an
(I
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There were fears ~:l{pressed in economic circles that a
democratic South Africa could swampthe region with
its pr'oduct.s r 1 kill local industry. These fears
have now been questioned. Although South Africa has
a relatively high technological bass, it is a high
cost producer , making its products uncompeti ti ve in
the region. The protection levels to manufacturing
industries in South Africa are the highest in the
world and the tariff and import control systems are
among the most complex of any member of tho World
'rrade Organisation (WTO).( 1(1,
If south Africa opens up, products from Zimbabwe,
Zambia and Namibia can compete there. As a separate
unit each country is too contained by its factor
endowment to deve] op its resources fully. Together
the SADCcouncrLes provide a more equable set of
linkages than South Africa has today. Regional co-
operation Nith south Afl'icct can be sustainect I but 'this
can only take place within Well-established regional
agreements.
co-operation and co-ordination in respect of physical
irlfrastructure is the sphere tY'here regional co-
operation OCC1.lrSmost naturally in southern Africa and
is, in f ,t, very promising because all participants
stand to benefit:
I
~)
Co-~·~ration in regional water and energy
prodl. .s: The South African economy will need
aCObS. to water resources from elsewhere in the
Bub-continent and acc~ss to regional hydro-power
resources tllonld also be beneficial. The l.esotho
Highlands water project is an oUi':.standingexample
of the beneti cs which irrtra-reg:ional co-operation
elf.lctril,:;:itv supplies and will be an attraction
..
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for tourists. Furth'3r,it will make south Africa
dependent upon Lesotho for a vital resource
(water). Close co-operation exists between the
Republ.ic, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and
Mozambique for the utilisation of common rivers
sllchas the Limpopo, the Nkomati and the Usutu.
rrheconsiderable hydroelectric potential of South
Africa's northern neighbours off€rs them
excellent opportunities for mutually beneficial
exchange with the relatively waterle~s south
Africa.
It will certainly be in the interests of both
Angola and South Africa for South African oil
purchases to be made in Angola, and for consumer
goods and manufactured products for the Angolan
narket; to be sourced in South Afric..a.
In brief I the achievement of interdependence and
complementarity in the region will ne~d determination
and the capacity t:o translate the logic of regional
co-ordination and planning into the SADe members'
national decisiC'm-making process. In the past,
na~.i.onalplanners have remained parochial ~n approach
and have not provided thQ Lnf'oz'matif.on required to
influence the political trade-offs that are naces~ary
in regional co-operation.
2. World limitations
The co-operation between South ,\frica and its
neighbours is taking place against the background of
profound cllang~:3in the world economy. A conflicting
policy shift is occurring in that at the same time as
the import3nce of regional integration, particularly
in w9!:1ternEurope, .NorthAmerica and the Asian Pacific
o
..
towards universal
muLti lateral liberalisatioll.
practical intermediate step
It is said to be a
1
1
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region is
Uruguay
growing, GATTmembers have concluded the
Round with the explicit purpose of
liberalising world trade.
with regard to regional economic integration, opinions
on its increasing importance differ; supporters see
it as complementa.ry to the attempt to achieve
elimination of trade bazriers; the critics, on the
other hand, see Hregularised integration as deviating
from the tenets of multilateral liberalisation and
leading to adverse effects on global welfare". (>U)
Whether integration represents a stimulant to the
multilateral process or implies discrimination against
third parties fit is indeed a challenge to other
subordinate region8, L. e. in Africa, in. the Middle
East And Far Eact I and in souuh and central Asia.
These movements towards bigger economic blocs will
transform the world, both economically and
politically. Firms within these economic blocs will
benefit from econonf.es of scale provided by large
llK~rketsI b) become competiti ve both internally and
internationally. Thi$ fO:i::rnspart of key changes Ln
the international division of labour which has far
reaching consequences, not only for the Third World as
a whole, but on the specific and changing place of the
economies of soutnerr, Africa, and particularly that of
South Africa.
There is I therefore 1 little prospect of southern
African countries meeting the challenge of such
changes in the world economyindividually. It is only
witIl a strong regional economy that southern Africa
will be able ~o compete in today's world economy.
The str\£mgthening of existing linkages as well as
potential for cross linkages (between sectors) is
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inportant. Despite the risk that regionalism reduces
the motivation for and commitment to multi-lateralism
it can still be regarded as a viable alternative for
southern bfrican countries not to be marginalised in
the globalisation of world relations.
b. CQmpeti t;i.v~nEl?s_9fSout.hAfri.9E1:L.!Lroduqts_9.ntUg
n,rnatj,Qnal_ma:rkej:;..
In the face of general worsening of terms of trade,
GNP per capita and exchange rate, there is an
increasing difficulty in maintaining an industrial
sector geared to import sUbstitution and financed by
the export of primary commodities. Even South Africa,
it must be noted 1 has not escaped such phenomena
during the. present global economic crisis. The
products of the South African manufacturing industry
are by and large not competitive on the world market.
A r~cAnt study undertaken by the south African Chamber
of Business (SACOB) showed that the prices of South
African manufaotured goods may be as much as 25
percent higher than those of overseas rivals in
several key export markets. (42)
At present, only a limited number of south African
non-primary products are considered to'be competitive
in the European market. They include processed
agricultural products, such as fruits and wine, some
engineering goods, and some clothing items. The
reasons for this lack of competitiveness are a matter
of dispute. The distortions by protection are un-
doubtedly one factor: The Industrial Development
corporation of South Africa (rDC) has estimated the
cost-increasing burden brought about by tariffs
(including protection surcharges) as 14 percent of the
GDP. (43)
Calculation~ undertaken by the IDe and Board of Trade
in 1991 show which sectors of manufacturing are
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6.4*
(J
adversely affected by hav.Inq tariffs imposeoi on their
imported inputs.
TABLE 4.3: MAHOFACTORI!lG SEC'I'OR INPUTS 'T'O KMmFAC'I'URING SEcr'OR
,--
I:SPinningand Weaving ind~~try .Pulp, paper and paperboardSynthetIc chemical and
Plastic
Basic Chemicals
I
Iron and steel basic industry
!IOll~ferrousmetals
Fabricated metals
Motor Vehicles
Iportion O-f -~ff Wall
input %
%
Effective
Surcharge
%
5.2 47.2*
4.8 10.3
6.6 27.3*
11.4 15.6
10.9 8.0
4.9 0.5
5.0 13.6
7.9 29.0*
2.0
o
5.8*
1.2
10.0*
10.2*
Level of
Protection
Hig!:
Hedium
High
High
Medium
Low
High
High
TOTAL 4.0~==-==~~=~===-==-------~=..= ==-=-.-=-~=.====--.==~-=.~==.===========
Note: *above average
Source: SAg)lh 1991:40
41.3 20.0
The regional market, as menti.oned before,' ~Ji)'l remain
important to manufacturers in the foreseeable rut.ure ,
Already, t.rad(~ with the other SACUmembers (BLSN
states) accotlnt~ for about 25 percent of South
Africa's manufectured exports(44). But South Afri,ca
will have to accept that i.t will have to buy more
African goods and services if it wants continued
access to African markets. An impor~ant aspect here
is the country's continued heavy dependence on the
export of one commodity, namely, gold. Equally
important is the desirability of expanding both the
range of export goods and diversity of markets. While
this implies an improved per'f'oz-manceI particularly for
manufactured goods in the markets of the
industrialised countries, it also underlines the
importance of retaining the traditional hold over the
regional market. (M;)
To counter any form of marginalisation and put
themsel ves in a better posi tion to inb:~ract
meaningfully with other economic blocs, South Africa
and the SADe have to pursue a policy of common------------------------~--------.----
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future: (46)
deeper economic co-operation and in'tegration on
the c~sis of balance, equity and mutual benefit,
providing for cross-border investment and trade,
and freer movement of factors of production ~
across national borders.
Common economic , political and social values and
systems, such as free enterprise, respect for the
rule of law ....The acceptance of co-operation
implies that certain national laws, norms,
procedures and regulations must be adjustvJ, and
a common investment code be formulated.
This form of organisation must be. based on mutual
benefits. The South African interest with regional
development has already formed the basis of extensive
discussions with international financial institutions.
The Wor.ld Bank I for examp le 1 "may be considering
projects in the region in a favourable light, given
the involvement of South African firms". (47)
3 • ,Foreign aid
It is vital, both for south Africq and the SADe, now
that the dividing element, apartheid has vanished, to
become good neighbours and promote a pattern of
economic relations based on interdependencao
There are indications that the core. industrial
countri~s will increasingly focus their attention
elsewhere, to give their aasLsuanoe where they bel i.eve
they can derive greater political dividends.
Eastern Europe and Russia clearly are now more
important to them and this iE' a consideration which
cannot be overstated:
There is an urgency about alJ : S • What the people
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Firstly, the amount of aid the European Union is
already discussing, $100 billion over 10 years,
to eastern Europe I to bring the East European
economies into line with ti~ poorest members of
the European Union is daunting enough. (48)
Secondly, the moral reb] sihility that the West
mayor ffi"y not feel for the economic development
of Africa as a whole is likely to be dWarfed by
its 'lagging conscience over the continuing under-
deve Lopment; of eastern Europe. (49)
of southern Africa share is + .ieed to create a new
meaning to their lives to escape a crippling
psychological and emotional dependency on the outside
world. South Africa should develop a strong economy
enabling it to serve as a catalyst for ±he economic
upliftment of southern Africa and even 'the rest of
Africa. South Africa must be regarded as being the
economic powerhouse of southern Africa. It has the
potential to lift the region out of the hole in which
it currently is and develop it through regional
economic integration and development.
c. 1HE BIRTH OF THE SADC.
The signing, on 17 August 1992, of a treaty
establishing the South.ern African Development
commurii ty (SADe) to replace the southern African
Development Co-ord; c<.l'::i~x ·~.:-l\d.:;.t·ence(S.~D e)signified
more than a change in acronym. It was a declaration
of intent by the signatories. r : ,e l:.ewSADe consists
of all the member states of the old SADec as well as
South Africa and Mauritius. But "emphasis has now
changed from development co-ordination to development
integration" .(50)
I
I•,
l~
III
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The 1992 SADC theme "Towards Regional Integration"
aims to give effect to the goal of regional
integration. Article 22(i) of the SADC's treaty
pz-ov ides for member states to submit a series of
protocols to "spell out the objectives and scope of
institutional mechanisms for co-operation and
integration". (51)
with the conclusion of the treaty, the SADC was
formalised in terms of the international law and its
structure was re-organised in view of the poas i.b.le
inclusion of a non-racial south Africa. (52) The treaty
provides the organi.sation with a legal personality f
meaning that the SADC may act on behalf of its member
states. While the SADCC concentrated on intensifyi.ng
co-operation, mostly by co-ordinating the activities
of member states, the new body calls for deeper
integration. (53)
For the achievement of its goals the SADC maintained
both the previous institutional and operational
structure (se6 Chapter II). South Af~ica is
reE:ponsible for the co-ordination of finance and
i.nvestment which is a newly created sector.
Three interli:'tkedevents were behind the regional
leaders' decis ion to re-examine the form and nature of
economic relations in the region. These were the
political changes in South Africa, the emergence of a
new direction for development, and the end of the Cold
War.
In a speech inaugurating the new parliament on
February 2, 1990, President De Klerk said that:
The general election on September 6 I
1989, placed our country irrevocably on
the road of drastic change. tJnder.lying
this is the growing realization by an
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Lncr-easi.ncr number of South Africans
that only- a negotiated understanding
amongthe representative leaders of the
entire population is able to ensure
lasting peace ... the well-being of all
in this country is linked inextricably
to the ability Qf the leaders to come
to terms with one another on a new
dispensation(54) •
The rapid changes which followed forced the SADCCto
contemplate the potential of and changes in the newly
emerging order in the region. The acuteness of the
contradiction in a regional integration that excluaed
South Africa was brought into the open by the SADC
that in 1993 declared "membership of a democratic
south Africa in SADe will give a major boost to
efforts already underway to promote regional
integration and co-operation in southern Africa II • (55)
The SADCmaintained that a free and democratic South
Africa would be welcome to join the organiGation.
But, the SADCrecognised that its loose organisation
"whose decisions are not binding on members,,(56)wO"Jld
incur serious problems in facing the dominant power to
the south.
legal comnrunltiy . Member states shall, through the
It was the danger of South African domination which
precipitated the implementation of a. fully fledged,
appropriate insti·;'_14t.i.')ns of the SADC1 co-ordinate,
rationalize and harmonize their overall macro-economic
and sectoral policies I proqrammes and projects in the
areas of oo+oper'at.Lon, (57) The SADCCsaw an urgent need
to prepare for the day when south Africa would be free
-t.o Q,ssert itself in the region, unencumbered by
international censure and sanctions.
~)
The direct implication of the process of change in
South Africa on the SADCCwas that an internationally
accepted non-racial South Africa would deprive the
organisation of its principal rei.sou a I' etire: the
lj?ssening of dependence on South Africa. The ~ove
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from SADCC to SADe has been a way for the SADCC to
respond to a crisis of identity in lace of the newJy
emerging order in the region. In August 1994, South
Africa became SADC's eleventh member. Its entry to
the organisation laid the foundation for the
implementation of a closer economic and political co-
operation between SADC's member states. South African
membership is a pre-requisite for the harmonisation of
the regional countries macro-economic policies. In
the opinion of the SADC,
South Africa's accession will
facilitate the process of multilateral
negotiations aimed at restructuring the
existing unbalanced regional economic
relations( ...) In particular new
opportuni ties could arise in co-
ordinating initiatives in various areas
at regional level, unhindered flow of
capital, labour and technological
resources to productive activities ~n
the region; further consolidation of
the regional market and mobilisation of
financial resources for natural and
human resources development in the
regil.)nas a whole. (58)
2. The emergence of new directions of _development.
a. To avoLd m~tnalisation
The SAilChas been formed against the background of a
trend that is increasingly edging t,::>wardsintegration
by means of preferential or free trade agreements, or
the formation of customs or economic unions. The
prediction (If: the imminent marginalisatiol1 0.: South
and southern Africa points to the absolute necessity
for the transformation of economic relations between
countries in the region, on a more productive and
competitive basis.
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Unless it responds creatively and
urgent.ly to the new challenges
confronting it, southern Africa, l.ike
the rest of the continent, faces the
bleak prospect of further margina-
l isation. (59)
In these circumstances, it becomes apparent that the
pursuit of a policy which enhances closer economic co-
operat Lon among all southern African countries
including South Africa, is important. The treaty
which transformed ·the SADCCinto the SADC~is very
broad and does not impose any specific obligations of
an economic nature c. ~ memberstates. Because of ·the
commitment of the S1"'",: to move towards a regional
integration, the secretariat j s in the process of
designing different protocols. These include a draft
protocol on finance and investment, a draft protocol
on the free movement of. people and a draft trade
protocol. It is probabJo +-hat there will'be pressure
to adopt the third protocol as a matter of priority
because of the negative implications of the current
trade flows in the reglan on the integration process
itself.
A further development which precipi ta·ted this
transformation was the existence in the region of more
stable and cohesive organisations: the CommonMarlcet
for East.ern and Southern Africa (COMESA)and the South
African customs Uhion (SACU).
b. Ex.istence of other regional insb.tutions
1. The emerg'ence of C.QMESA
~)
For a number of reasons, going back to their
establishment, there is always intense rivalry and
some antipathy between the bADCand COMES~.(60)
j
j
1
1
1
The:.Pr., erential 'tIrade Art:!2"(P'I'A) was establ.ished in
I ..
)\s.
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December 1982. Its stated intention being the
"promotion of co-operation and development in all
fields of trade, customs, industry, transport,
communication, agriculture, natural resources and
monetary Qffairs with the ain of setting the standard
of living of its people and fostering cluser relations
among member states". (61) The F'rA was transformed in
December 1994 into a Common Market for Eastern and
southern Africa (CO.'1F."1A),its purpose being "'chp.
liberalisation 01 trade ar.len. mragl.ng co-operation
in industry, agriculture, transport and
communications". (62) Envisaging the elimination of
trade barriers by the year 2000, it also looked to the
creation of a regional common market.. Both SADCC and
P'I'Astated that a democratic South Africa would be
welcome to join them, but the lack of a treaty
diminished the chances of the SADCC to attract South
African membership. IIrl'hedecision of the PTA
authority, taken in January, 1992 that the
Preferential Trade Area be transformed into a common
market II (63) might have been t'h€ catalyst for the SliDC
treaty itself, and have deterred the PTA D from
becoming a "common market" and swallowing the SADCC.
It would not be going too far to say that both viewed
South African membership as the ultimate prize. The
decision of the emerging new South Africa was
perceived as the only factor determining the future of
these two institutional arrangements. South Africa's
choice was seen as decisive in ensuring victory for
one over the other in a battle for survival~
As South Africa was moving towards demoor'acy, it
became imperative for the SADe to move a step towards
economic integration. with regard to trade there is
good historical bas Ls for such u movement. The
countries of southern Africa list South Africa as a
major trad.ir;Jpartner for export and import.
TOP TEl !rueAl !!(PORT SOORCES fOR 1993
VALUE \ OF AFRICA % OF il)RIJ) t An GROOJl
(R lillions) (198~93)-
Zilll!abwe 669.2 n.9 0.Y6 9.2
Zaire 262.3 16.4 0.37 53.0
Malawi 160.9 10.1 0.23 28.3
cote D/lvoire 150.7 9.4 0.22 56.0
Zalbia 76.4 4.8 0.11 87.1
Hotalbique 60.9 3.8 0.09 36.4--Kenya 31.3 2 (\ 0.04 16.0-
'togo 30.3 1.9 0.04 5.9
Tanzania 21.9 1.4 0.03 91.3
Chad 19·7 1.2 0.03 230.2
rout OF 'OOP "'Eli 1483.3 92.9 2.21 22.0_]-
~: Industrial Developsent corporgtlon ~f ~~~ica Limited, January Jq9~, Jonannosburg.
IJ
- ;
'roP m mrCAll EIPOR'rDES'l'IlfA'flO!lS ro~ 1993
VAl.lJR ~ OF lFl.L.J. ' ~ OF {rKlRLD AV ~ GRai'rII
(R unions) (1989"")':\\-
I
._--
ziJbabwe 1838.0 23.8 3.41, . 16.5 I'f- . .._ ,
_!?zaDbique 1369.2 17.7 2.54 88.4 --iZambia 1349.8 17.5 2.S) 31.8
Malawi 662.2 8.6 1.23 11.0
Mauritius 565.7 7.3 1.05 19.9-
Zaire 342.4 4.4 11.64 ~1.5
1
Angola 264.5 3.4 0.49 ~3.S. -
Kenya 239.0 3.1 0.44 117.4- _,.
RelUlion 193.9 2.5 0.36 14.5.. ~ --
Madagascar 142.1 1.8 0.26 ± 55.7 j,_'fOTAL OF TOP m 6966.8 90.3 12.9s 22 9-
S9.Y.t~.~: Industrial Dev~lopllent cQt'P.Qtation of SQuth Africa Limited, .January 1995.
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TABLE 4.6: TRADING PAR~
F TOP TEN AFRICAli TRADING PARTNERS FOR 1993 IVALUE ~ or AFRICA .~ WORIJ) AV% GROWTH(R .~ons) (1989-~~ \<--
Zi1!lbabwe 2%7.2 26.9 2.24 14.3.... --
11.ozambique 1430.1 15.4 1.2B 38.3-
Zambia 1426.2 15.3 1.27 33.2...
lIalawi 823.1 8.8 0.74 15.5
Zaire 604.7 6.11 0.54 'l0.1
Mauritius 585.2 6.3 0.!i2 J.9.8- -
_Kenya 270.3 2.9 0.24 76.3 .-
Angola 269.4 2.9 0,24 74.9
Cote D'Ivoire 248.9 2.7 0.22 37.4
Reunion 194.8 2.1 0.17 14.5
TOTAL OF TOP TEN 8359.9 89.8 6.79 22.2. . .
Sou{ce: ;nuustrial Development Corporation of south Africa Limited, January 1995.
Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 specifically identify South
Africa's top ten African trading partners with respect
to imports, export~ and total trade. statistics from
1990 indicate that of the customs union's total
Af:rican +mpor+s, '19 percent came from Mozambique,
Angola r Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi' and 21 percent
from the rest of Africa. (64)
Tables 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 also indicate that Zimbabwe,
Mozambique, zambia, Malawi have South Africa as their
main trading partner.
I
~
I
2. The southern African qustoms union (SACQl
The Southern African customs Union is a free trade
area. Its members are South Africa, Botswana,
Lesotho, swazi.land and since 1990, Namibia. (65)
118
The first formal a9reement which laid the foundation
of SACU was signed in 1910 between the Union of South
Af:cica and the British Protec1..:oratesof Basutoland I
Bechuanaland and Swaziland. since 1910, only thrae
substantiVd amendments have been made to the origlnal
agreement:
in 1969, it was rewritten t.otake account of the
BLS countries I changeCi status as independent from
Britain.
in 1978, it was amended to build a stabilising
factor into the revenue-sharing formula.
in 1990, it was changed to allow for the
admittunce of Namibia as a member. (61')
Th~ .AClJ's ob]ectives(67) include:- encouraging the
econ-nn i;:,,: development of the customs Union (CU) areas
as a whole; promoting the deve l.opment;.and diver-
sification (industrialisation) of the ecoriomies of the
less advanced members; and sharing equitably the
benefits from trade.
The major provisions of the 1910 Agreement required
the free flow of goods among the member countries(68),
a Common External Tariff (CET) with the smaller
partners maintaining a custom duty structure similar
to that obtained in South Africa at all times. (69) As
sllch, goods that are grown, produced or manufactured
in the CUGtoms Union Area (eUA) are subject to the
same excise duties as are in force in South Africa,
once these have been collected, they are paid into the
Consolidated Revenue Fund of South Africa. (70) To
facilitate the free interchange of goods, the Common
Monetary Area (CMA) was established by the Trilateral
Monetar.y AgreemEmt of 1986 and links swaziland, South
Africa, Leaotiho and Namibia in a parallel union
arrangement. Botswana 'hiS a member of the earlier
Rand Monetary Area Agreement (RMA) but withdrew in
1975.(71)
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Despite the fact that BACUis a Union of unequals and
that the BLSNcountries are underdeveloped with regard
to South Africa, its existence has not hindered the
development of BLSNto a degree which has retarded
their growth and development in any s.ignifj.cant way.
When compared to the SADCand COMESA,the SACUhas
been the most successful regional body. Two main
r8asons can be attributed to why SACUworks:
the economies of the BLSNcountries are. largely
complementary, not competitive
there is enough political will amongst the
members to make it work.
Currently, re-n~gotiations of the customs Union
Agreement (CUA) are underway. Beside the fact that
the SACUwor'ks, problems exist which need to be
addressed. There are signs that South. Africa is
unhappy with the growing burden of the revenue-sharing
formula(72) which it regards as being "unduly generous
to Botswana f Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia. (73)
Between the period of 1983 and 1990 South Africa
received approximatel~ 80 percent of the customs union
revenue pool; by 1992/1993, this figure had fallen to
66,4 percent. (74) South Africa is also dissatisfied
with the stabilisation factor which. had served to
increase the original 1,42 enhancement factor to as
high as 1,77 in certain years. (75) The more South
Africa reduces its customs tariffs in terms of the WTO
obligations, the more it '\trill penalise itself. (76)
South Africa claims that it can no longer afford the
present formula as it needs all resources at. its
disposal for the Reconstruction and Development
Progrdmme.
For \:;ne RLSNcountries, they are of the opinion that
t.heir .:sdHU,B of the customs union revenue is too small
an::l they are in fact subsidising South Africa. Their
complaints concern some aspects of the 19691 Agreement
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and supplementary agreements:
the two years de:~ay in the disbursement of funds
from the common revenue pool is seen by the BLSN
as being nothing more than an interest free loan
by them to South Africa, for which they receive
no compensation;
the detrimental price raising eff.ect on the BLSN
economie!S~
the lack of consultatj and need to democratise
decision-making proced~res in the SACU;
the perceived inhibiting effects on industrial
development in the BLSN(77);
loss of discretionary authority to pursue an
independent nat' nal fiscal policy because South
hfric~ unilaterally sets customs and excise
duties for the ent:lre CU area which the BLSN are
obliged to follow;
polarisation of economic development in South
Africa, to the detriment of BLSN; and
limitat:i.onson the BLSN ability to protect infant
~.ndustries given the narrowly defined eligibility
criteria and other provisions - in order to be
eligible, the industry in question must be in a
position tv supply at least E() percent of the
SACU market - a coned t.Lon that does not I however,
apply to South African manufact~rers.(n)
The future of the SACU will also depend on its
relations with COMESA and the SADe. As it is
currently organised, membership of the SACU is
incompatible with that o~ COMESA or any other
preferential trade arrangement. (79) In terms of the
rules of the SACU, members cannot grant preferential
entry to imports from non-member countries unless with
the express consent of their SACU partners. (80) In this
case, Lesotho and Swaziland who are also members of
COMESA, cannot become full members of the latter and
will have to choose between it and the SACU. (Ill)
\;
~
i,
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As far as the SACU relationship with the SADC is
concerned, an association ag~ceement: can be si<:.;ned
between "theSACU and the remaining SADe countries with
the aim being a gradual reductivn of trade barriers
and an in~rease in economic cohesiveness which is an
important ingredient for successful integration in
soutihez'nAfrica. Thus there would be a Common Market
which would allow for free movement of capital, labour
and goods and containing some harmonisation of fiscal
and monetary policy. (C2) This is to say, the elilergence
of the SADC does not vitiate the need for the'SACU to
continue under a renegotiated agreement, leaving open
the possibility of eventually being merged into a
wider SADC, as South Africa is already a member of the
SADe.
D. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNI'I'Y'S INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA
AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS.
The three years of negotiations from 1990 to 1993 to
end apartheid have had important implications on the
earlier foreign inv~lvement in southern Africa. As
the changing situation in South Africa coincides with
a particular set of regional and domestic dimensions
of change, it also affects relationships between the
international community and t.heentire' region.
The new form of involvement in South Africa/s affairs
by the international community has far-reaching
consequences for the political and economic situation
in neighbouring countries. Three inter-related
reasons for a role f9r the international community,
from coercive interference to direct involvement, will
form the foundation of the analysis.
1. The moral-ethical reason.
The moral reason largely focused on the objective of
transforming South Africa from authori tarian rule
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based on racial discrimination, to an apartheid-free
democratic society.
Attributing a moral-ethical role to the international
community regarding its L volvement in building a new
South Africa i has two aspec'cs . (83)
- Firstly, that some members of the international
community f (U.S. and Britain) took a soft line on
apartheid in its fight against communf.sm, The Western
powers saw South Africa as a bastion aqaLrat; communism
in southern Af~·ica. This harder West-East line
characterised mainly the Thatcher and Reagan
governments which took office respectively in 1979 and
1981. A more radical approach argues that capitalism
and apartheid were mutually reinforcing phenomena.
Western powers were not ready to abandon.South Africa
because of the active role that South Afri~a played in
fighting the advancement of communism in Southern
Africa. As South Africa embarked on the process of
change r the Western powers felt that helping South
Africa in its march to democracy, might prove thE"
greatest serlice they could offer to an old friend.
0°::'
There was evidently a realisation abroad that South
Africa I s transi tion to a democratic constitutional
order was fraught with the danger of a racial
breakdown. It was then imperati ve to help South
Africa to avoid the risk of a racial break-up, which
already divided social groups. Also, a racial
explosion in. South Africa would have had , neqaui.ve
implications especially for Britain and the United
states. It would have influenced negatively the
fragile racial co-existence in both countries. It
would also have precipitated a flux or South African
Bri tish passport holders into Britain and created
accompanied by a combination of :threats of
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unexpected social problems I such as an increase in
unemployment. The desired .)moc:ratic outcome became
by no means a foregone conclusion.
The typj cal instructive case of the new form of
international community involvement in South Africa's
domestic affairs concerns the referendum of March
1992. In that referendum, only whites were asked to
vote for or against the reform process undertaken by
President De Klerk in February 1990 I which f,oJasaimed
at the establishment of a new constitution' through
negotiations.
The National Party campaign for "yes" was backed by
foreign countries for the first time in a white South
African election since 1983. Foreign endorsement of
the De Klerk government's reform initiatives was
internat.ional punishment In t.he event of a "noll
verdict, and by promises i.)f economic rewards from
abroad if lIyes" won.
At the start of the campaign, the USAState Department
weighed in with a statement that a retreat from Codesa
negotiations, seen as the lik~ly consequence of a "no"
vote, would be a devastating step backwards towards
international isolation and domas't.Lcdiscord in South
Africa(8~) .
The White House threatened to "hit South Africa like
a bomb if De Klerk lost the referendum and the
Conservative Party won a spl;)sequent election". (85) And
George Bush, by then President of the United States,
threatened to impose "immediate and comprehensive
sanctions against a Conservative ruled South
Africa". (B6)
124
From Bri t.ai.n, the most signif icant threat came from
parliament. Bri tish MPs of all parties approved a
Commonsmotion in which white South Africans w~re
gi ven a serious warning that a "no" vote in the
referendum would lead to the reimposition of sanctions
and South Africa's renewed isolation. (8?)
Gt.rmany placed great emphasis on economic incentives
in statements on the referendum. (8S) A motion in the
Bundestag, introduced by the two parties. in the
governing coalition, expressed support for De Klerk's
reform policy and proposed the lifting of all
remaining sanctions, save the arms embargo, in the
event of a "yes" vote. (89) As an immediate inducement,
"Bonn approved its first official development aid
project w9rtl1 R2. 5 million I in South Africa". (90)
Japan's position t\1as stated by the country I s most
powerful business group I the Federation 'of Economic
Organisations. It warned that "South AfrIca would
face a cc'd shoulder from Japan if whites voted "no"
to reform. (91) The European Union through its
parliament articulated its serrt Lmerrcs by declaring
that "a positive vote on March 17 will open the
possibili ty for the rapid removal of all furtber
restrictions on normal relations (with South Africa),
other than the arms E'mbargo".(92)
From Africa, views were expressed by the OAUthrough
its Secretary General Sa] Lm AhmedSalim. He expressed
the hope that wIlite South p~fricans would for their own
and the country's sake vote 't;o continue the reform
process. (93)
The frontline states through their delegates at a
Summit in Lusaka, stressed the need for whites in
South Africa to "realise that peace and security for
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all South African's lay in the con~inuation an~
successful conclusion of codeaav • (9~)
The result of the referendum, 68,6 percent of the 2.8
million ballots cast supported De Klerk's reform
initiatives, with 31,2 percent against, was
universally welcomed. (95)
Having invested so heavily in the struggle
apartheid, the international community had at
moral obligation to assist South Africa
against
least a
in its
- Secondly, the international community played an
important role in the demise of apartheid.. After
World t'1arII, international morality with i+..semphasis
on human rights, freedollland independence for all
nations, found South Africa I s racial policies
abhorrent, often equated with Nazism and Fascism. The
Lnt.ernatd.onaf community isolated so-rch Africa and
app~ied calculated political, economic, socio-cultural
and military sanctions c:gainst it. At the same time,
it granted aid to the SADCC as a way of ..minimising
the negative effects of Soutb Africa's p~litical and
economic destabilisation and sanctions on :neighbouring
countries.
critical period of transition,'"). assistance in
building a ne~ society, in other words. The
upliftment of the impoverished and otherwise deprived
majority of the South African population might prove
a much more daunting task and one requiring the
comm.itment of :"''1nymore resources than the campaign
against apartheid.
In a regional context, the internaticnal community
believes that a politically &table South Africa will
constitute an engine of economic development for the
region. In fact ,one of the reasons for regional
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economic decline is that there was no country in
southern Africa with sufficient econom.i.c strength to
serve as an economic growth catalyst. A successful
transition to democracy in South A~rica, will place at
the region's disposal the engine for economic
development t.hat, it desperately needs.
2. 'rhe consolidation of thf;.'~outcome of transfor-
mation.
The consolidation of the outcome of transformation
discussion derives from a utility argument. Although
economic sanctions against South Africa had
contributed to the eradication of apartheid, they had
strong negative impacts on the South African economy
and on that of the entire r-egion.
The image of a new South Africa is projected by the
Lnt.ornat.LoneI community as the successor to apartheid
promoting a sudden and complete change of policy.
Ending apartheid was essential but not enough. The
very means through which this has been achieved should
now be harnessed, almost in reverse, to ensure that
the upliftment of the South African society(97) is
achieved.
I
I
The international community has assumed .'or itself a
special responsibility in assisting the formation of
a new South Africa. rrhere is a clear re'oogni tion
amongst the members of the international com:munityof
the need for measures to assist in the recovery of the
South African economy. Various negotiations in which
South Africa is engaged with International Monetary
Fund, (IMF), World Bank (WB), European Union (EU), and
other developed countries are a testimony to this.
The underlying belief has been that "without a much
higher level of economic acti vi ty r'esu" ting in jobs
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and the means to undertake the enormous social
upliftment which is needed, no political reform can
ultimately succeed". (98)
South Africa's alsoneighbours suffered ·the
consequences of apartheid. For more than two decades
the region's leaders strove for black liberation and
were involved in East-west conflicts. Because of the
political and economic implications of the situation
in South Africa on the entire region, helping South
Africa on its march towards democracy is intimately
linked to the restoration of peace and security in the
enti:r-eregion.
The international community's intervention in south
Africa in a regional.perspective is to ensure that the
transition succeeds. Success in South Afri'~ could
improve the prospects for the region's new-demoor-aci.es
by setting an example of tolerance, fair voting, free
association and free speech.
3. The re-integration of South Africa into the
international community.
The international community/s involvement in the
process of creating a new South Africa relates not
only to the political economy of South Africa, but
also to that of t:he region as a whole. I'ts interest
is based on the concept of dependence and interdepen-
dence.
western involvement in South Africa's transition to
democracy can be interpreted in three ways:- firstly,
as an expression of its desire to monopolise control
over the development of the situation in South Africa.
That is precisely why the Western countries were
pressurising the ANC as a future government to depart
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from a commitment to a socialist orientated economyto
one of a market economy. The West's interest lies in
keeping South Africa within the capitalist system.
The Western countries, therefore, have worked towards
the elimination of apartheid \;1hile at the same time
providing South Africa's F. itcs with firm political
and economic gua·:-antees. This policy pertains despite
the fact that in terrrl~ of two-way trade the WestI s
gain is comp~ratively ~or.
- Secondly F the international community in' helping
South Africa in its effort to achieve democracy is
simultaneously helping the entire region. The reasons
are both political and economic I but the two are
interlinked. South Africa has a vi tal interest in
seeing stability and accourrt.ab l« government in the
surrounding countries.
Southern Africa is South Africa's naturai hinterland
and off~rs a "s~bstantial market for it- manufactured
goods, which, as indicated, are to a large extent not
competitive overseas II • (9:) Because South Africa is
politically and economically the dominant pole of
influence in the region, it will ensure that security
and stability characterise the region where its
interest lies. In fact, unsettled conditions
elsewhere in the region will deter foreign investment
in South Africa a8 well.
The well-being of countries in southern Africa is
closely linked. The international commitment to the
region needs to be ta~en into account every time when
a formal relationship between South Africa and the
international community is considered. This will
ul t.Lmat.eLy contribute to overcoming imbalances in the
development and 'trade in the region and help to
stimulate co-operation. As the SADe has itself
,~
The EU policy should, therefore, address two
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a:i:firmed: "South Africa could not hope to grow and
develop while the rest of the region is stagnated. (100)
The international community should ensure that
whatever actions are 'taken, they do not raise barriers
between South Africa and its neighbours.
In an increasing num7Y:~rOL cases, external partners
are making a linkage b€t.Neen an equitable- relatiorl:"lhip
in Southern Africa and South Africa's inclusion on
favourable terms in arrangements with external
parties. This is parti~uldrly notable in the'case of
the European Union (ED). The ED, like the World Bank,
favours regional market Lnt.eqr'at.Lon as a means to
promote the devaLc.pmer+ of African countries, and as
a step towards freer world trade. (101)
Referring to a possible South African membership of
the SADC1an official EU publication expressed the
view that "this would strengthen the economic
potential of the region, and would be wholeheartedly
encouraged by the community" . (102)
south Africa's duali~tic
developed
nature, wit~ the
and underdevelopedjuxtaposition of
features, makes it a unique partner in the context of
EU relations with other African countries. The EU
believes that an active South African role is
indispensable if the region is to have any hope for
meaningful econond,c progress. Both the EU's 'twin
track' approach and Programme for Reconstruction and
Development (ERDP) show that south Africa's social,
economic and political stability is central to
regional stabilii:v and. development.
interrelated issues. The first concerns the inclusion
in the bilateral agreement of measures that would
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assist South Africa to play the expected pivotal role
in uplifting the region's economy. The second, is
that the EU shJuld ensure that whatever actions are
taken, they do not raise barrie_s between South Africa
and its neighbours. These two issues are fundamental
to the hastening of sustainable development and to
achieving a balanced growth in Southern Africa. In
pursuing this course r however, unrealistic
expectations th~t South Africa will be southern
Africa's saviour should uS discouraged.
Thirdly, international community involvement is
attracted by the apparently better investment climate,
infrastructura and services! managerial, technical and
technological capacities in South Africa than in the
rest of the region. souch African firms are welcome
partners f'or overseas interests because theL
organisation, operating procedures, value. systems and
technology arc similar to those o~ their ciounterparts
,i,n western Europe or North Amer, I, a.
Howeve,r, a regional investment, code, together with
joint efforts to pr'omot;ethe region Lrrcernat.Lonaj.Ly ,
would no doubt be helpful.
The process of dismantling apartheid has been a challenge
to the old regional order.
The dismantling of apartheid has opened dn alternative for
the regional political economy from the st.andpoint of peace
and co-operation. South Africa has renounced its
destabilisatir.Jnpolicy and has withdraWll its support from
UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique. 'rhe fact that
South Africa has joined the SADe Ltplies a change in
attitude from both sides. I'c implies mutual agreement to
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co-operate and to end a situation which was termed as em
economy of conflicts and dominat~~n. But national,
regional and international factors (economic, social and
political) might contribute positively or negatively to the
consolidation of th1.i: co-oper at.Lon, However, under
circumstances tl,thereapaz-cheid no longer exists, the
apparent <;;xistenceof the level of interdependence between
states a~d the willingness of the SADe and south Africa to
work t()gether to lay a bas is for lasting peace and progress
throughout southern Af:t:ica,increases the possibility of
cc--operratifon based on zhe principles of equi ty and of
mutual benefits, as opposed to dependence and domination.
The approach t.o economic co-operation/integration in
southern Africa will constitute ~he focus of discussion in
the next chapter.
it
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CHAPTER V
ECON9M.IC CO-OPERA TION
INTRODUCTION:.
pattern of relations. Economic relations in southern
This chapter will discuss regional economic co-operation
and integration in southern Africa. It also examines the
key factors in the evolution of co-operative projects in
southern Africa.
South Africa has joined the SADCas the eleventh member.
It means there is no doubt that the SADChas survived the
challenge associated with the end of apartheid. HoweverI
it also means that the BADCI, iber-s Heed to'_'find a new
approach to co-operation appropriate to their concrete
circumstances and one capable of rest.ru.cturing the existing
Africa are characterised by structured inequalities and
acute imbalances in favour of South Africa. The major
challenge for southern Afrir.a is tc establish a unified
market in a region comprising a 'super pO~ler' and
relatively fragile economies. The search for options will
be done with reference to the three main approaches
identified in development theorie~: trade or market
integration, integration through project co-operation and
development integration.
A. APPROACHES TO INTEGRATION AND THEIR ~I.EVANCE TO THE
SADe
1. The tra/?,') or market integr_q.tJon
The trade or market in. ~grati.on "is the orthodox trade
Liberalisation of factor movements
Market)
Harmoni::;vt.Lon of social and economic policies
(Economiccommunity)
(Common
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liberalisat.ion
trade theory
approach" (1)
which in
of trade
based on neo-classical
practice focuses on
relations through linaarliberalisation
arrangements:
Internal t.rade liberalisation (Free 'l'rade Area)
Commonexternal protection (CustomsUnion)
Unification of social and economic policies and
establishment of a supra-national autho~ity.
critics of the market integration approach have
suggested that the above sequence is inappropriate for
in'~egration between developing countries, and that
harmonisation of policies should take place at a much
earl ier stage. 'rho market integration approach has
been .identified with the European Union.
The experience of past attempts, also strongly
sug9'€.st.; that for "developing countries the basic
economtc rationale for co-operation and integration
should not be sought in orthodox theory with its
emphusd.s on stat.ic criteria of efficient resource and
product Lon reallocation". (2) The justifi cation for
integration should rather be based on dynamic
considerations associated with the gro~th and
development potential that co-operation and
int.egration could provide to the count.ries involved. (3)
i"
The peculiar economiccircumstances in most developing
count.ries lessen the applicability of this approach.
The above cri t.Lc Lsm is based on the assumption that
there are high levels of compj emerrcard tv among the
integrating economies. It is contended that, in
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general, this assumption does not hold for developing
countries whose economi.es tend to raly on the export
of primary commodities. This also holds in respect (.If
situations such.as the one this thesis examines, 'iNhere
the superiority of the South African economy would
certainly lead to unequal development tending towards
polarisation of the total trade of the contracting
partners. The economic groupings in Africa face the
same obstacles ~ differemt levels of economic
development among mcmber s and the uneven dd.s't.ri.but.Lon
of benefits, which have precipitated the dislocation
or contributed ·to the poor performance of many African
economic groupings.
In Africa •••the effect has been the
opposite to Europe mainly because the
point of departure of regional
cooperative ventures has been wide
disparities between partners,
r1.isal'.ti.::ulated economies externa-l
depcndcn~ies and generally a low-level
of development. (4)
2. Integration through project co-operation
The integration through co-operation approach has
largely been based on the view that the greatest
obstacle to regional trade and int~gration in the
south is due to underdeveloped production structure
and infrastructural deficiencies. Being in the same
situation, the SADC rejected the practice among member
states of establishing regional dE!'velopmentstrategies
based upon the orthodox thcory of'integration.
The SADCC, however, opted for a proO''I':'amllleof
integration through project co-operation (see Chapter
3). The focus has been on functional co-operation ur
project co-operation on the grounds that the
development of production structures and the required
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infrastructure should be the first priority. Despite
this fact, the SADCC did not escape the difficulties
associated with economic co-operation as far as trade
and industry were concerned. Project co-ordination
has been recognised as having had only a limited
impact in promoting deeper or wider co-operation and
integration. (5)
3. Development integ~atiQU
I
The project co-operation approach to integration has
tremendous appeal, particularly when after almost 13
years of co-operation, ti.1eSADCC has not achieved much
in developing regional policies. similarly, the
failure to givt! priority t.otrade relatic.ns was seen
as a serious sbortcoming. By the end of the 80'S as
the result of international, regional and soutf;
African internal changes, the SADCC came under
i.ncreased persuasion to evolve. towards more formal
regional integration models.
The development integration approach is recognised as
an elaboration or variant of project co-operation. It
f:Lr,ds its foundation in the premise that
"incompatibilities arising from underdeveloped
procuct i.ve structures and trading patrcez'nsI make it
Lmpoas Lbte to promote integrat~ion through laisser-
fainl policies". (6)
Sout.bt~rnAfrica does not fulfil the four conditions
requit:ed by the standard t,heory ~!c· a successful
regional integration:
Co~ntries should be at a similar level of
industrial development.
They should have industrial sectors that cOl11pete
with one another so that trade can be created
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within the area.
Member states should have the potential to
develop complementary industrial sec·tors so that
the benefits of integration are spread/ and most
important,
they should have a history of substantial trade
among them.
contrary to the situation in We."Jt·.ernEurope in the
1950's, intra-regional trade is quite unidil~ctional
in southern Africa. For this reason, the development
integration approach provides for continuing with
functional co-operation to address many ui the
product.Lon and infrastructure barriers deriving from
underdevelopment.
But it goes beyond such a focus and stresses the need
for macro and micro co-ordin.ation in a multi-sectoral
progrd11Ut1e that embr-acas production, infrastructure and
trade.
The development approach reli~s on the identification
of major constraints to intra-regional trade in goods
and services, investment and payments and thereafter
developing measures to overcome these constraints.
Therefore, the issue of strengt~ening existing
linkages as well as cross-linkage between sectors may
assist in enhancing attempt.s to integrate the various
economies of the ~cgion.
In the
within
and/or
southern African region, the major sectors
which intra:-regional contact, oc-operat.Lon
linkage already exist, can be identified as
trade, energy, water resources, agriculture,
transport I telecommunications and labour. Progress in
co-ordination and co-operation in each sector should
proceed almost immediately without considering what
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happens in other sectors. This flexibility will place
great emphasis on 'variable geometryl and the 'multi-
speed' co-ordination across different sectors.
But in strengthening the multi-sectional linkage and
co-operation in southern Africa, it will be necessary
for the SADC to evolve approaches which will ensure
that:
The activities and exper.tences of exis-t:ingco-
ordinating bodies are built on, towards the
creation of sp~cific regional co-ordinating
entities, answerable to the central regional
decision-making bodies,
Regional economic integration in the southern
African context. is implemented in increments
towards the ideal of 'regional co-operation and
integration, consistent .with ~pe needs,
cons .raLnt.sand possLb.i.Li.cLae of southern Al'.l::ica;
Sout. Africa's relative gigantism and its
insensibility about the interest::; of its
neighbours are addressed at an early stage;
Politically acceptable modalities for sharing
coscs and benef its in shott and long term are
formulated;
Conscious efforts by co-operating parties are
seen as essential, both to define the scope and
sectors of co-operation and identify appropriate
strategies and mechanisms to overcome impediments
to :mtegration i
The notion t.hat south A.frica is a 9ateway to
southern Africa and that its development will
siml,ltaneously ensure the development of the rest
of the region has been abandoned. But an
integrated view of the region, with the
establishment of new economic development
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policies aimed at its growth as a whole has been
adopted. (7) In such a sense I a regional outlook
which takes note of how all the countries in the
regions can benefit equally is the way forward;
The Reconstruction and Development Programme
(RDP) must provide the bas:is for redefining South
Africa's interactions with her southern African
neighbours. In that context, sustainable
reconstruction and development in southern Africa
is in the long run a pre-requisi te for
sustainable RDP in South Africa.
Each country accepts that succes.s rul regional
economic co-operation will entail some sacrifice
of national sovereignty and a willingness to
incur short-term nat.Lona I losses for long-term
regional_gains.
The Balkanisation of the region in different
economic groupings ·with different t..r:aderegimes
is brought to an end. This point refers to the
multi-membership of the SADe I s member states.
The SADe endeavours to promote regional trade
will be c.onstrained by a range of institutional
factors (see chapter 3); It makes little
sense, nor is there any justification for having
three expensive parallel organisations at a time
most countries in the region are near economic
collapse.
Against the backdrop of a fast changing world, as
the creation of trading blocs highl ighted i11
previous chapters suggests, alongside other major
developmental obstacles such. as drought, debt,
poor terms of trade, import cuts; southern Africa
cannot afford to cont.inue fragmenting its efforts
if it is really serious about its intentions to
create a working common market capable of
competing with other trading blocs.
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The relationship between development and good
governance is recognised. Poor governance has
constituted a major "non-economic barrier to
development" in southern Africa and democra-
tisation of the political and economic systems is
essential to the success of any programme aiming
to accelerate economic growth and development.
a . The SADC I S t:);'adeJ;LC!tterns
B. CRITIG&_11II:IEH~NT~_ OF~ THE J~EG~TIQl:l_~:PROCESS IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA
Despite early intentions to develop mechanisms to
enhance intra-SADC trade since 1986, no movement on
this front has taken place. In the assessment of the
SADC, the lack of intra-SADe trade and the importance
of south African exports to the regio?, have been
stressed already. One of the key issues of current
southern African co-operation, since South Africa
underwent pOlitical transformation and joined the
SADC, is the question of the regional trade regime.
Ideally, if "regional integration is taken to its
logi.calconclusion, the whole of SADC would become one
customs union". (8) However, the act~1al asymmetrical
trade exchange between South Africa and her neighbours
is unencouraging for any economic organisation
aspiring to form an integrated market.
A prominent feature of the current southern African
regional economy is the deeply entrenvhed and highly
uneven trade relations between South Africa and the
rest of the SADe members. The following tables 5.1
and 5.2 deal with the SACU I S trade with each SAIJC
mem~er C0untry, as well as the share which it
comprises of the total SACU trade with the SADe.
IDLE 5.1 : tIfll9.RTS
TOTAL SACU IMPORTS FROM SADC COOJi'I.'R1ES (R IULLIOlI)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Value ~ Value t Value ~ Value % Value t
Share Share Share Share Share
Zi!babwe 470.0 78.1 452.3 83.2 478.5 76.5 818.3 77.8 669.2 67.3
Malawi 59.4 14.3 82.0 10.5 92.2 14.8 112.9 12.6 161.0 16.2
ZaEbia 6.2 1.3 7.5 1.1 15.6 2.5 41.3 3.9 76.4 7.7
Hozan- 17.6 5.3 30.5 3.1 87.8 6.1 47.6 4.5 60.9 6.1
bique -
Tanzania 1.G 0.5 2.6 0.3 1.1 0.2 10.4 1.0 21.9 2.2
Angola 9.6 0.1 0.6 1.8 0.2 0.0 0.9 0.1 4,a 0.5
'rol'AL 564.8 100.0 574.9 100.0 625.3 100.0 1051.4 100.0 994.1 100.0
Source: SAllCsecretftriat, Gaborone, 1994
..~
_',;.. ...:=.'t.-
TOm SACU EXPDRTSI~ SAIlC COUJlTRlliS (R l!l1LIOll)
1989 11990 1991 1992 1993
1--- -
Value t Value t Value ~ Value t Value ~
Share share Share Share Share
ziJIbab- 998.3 43.9 1174.5 44.5 1619.6 43.7 1567.0 35.2 1838.0 32.9
we
lIozall- 373.1 16.4 (67.7 17.5 691. 7 18.7 678.7 15.2 1369.2 24.5
bique
Zallbia
r
446.9 19.6 531. 7 20.0 664.7 17.9 1114.6 25.0 1349.8 24.2
Malilwi 436.4 19.2 421.5 15.9 580.3 15.7 699.2 15.7 662.2 11.9
".. ;::<.
A.'lgola 18.9 0.8 53.3 2.0 138.0 3.7 369.2 8.3 264.5 4.7
Tanza- 3.1 0.1 11.3 0.4 10.2 0.3 25.8 0.6 104.6 1.9
nia I
TOTAL 2276.7 100.0 2657.0 100.0 3704.5 100.0 4454.5 100.0 5588.4 100.0
,,J
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Immediately evident from the above tables is the wide
gap that exists between South Africa's exports to and
imports from the rest of the region.
Note that the trade statistics quoted are those of the
entire SACU which means that Botswana, Lesotho,
Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa's l.mportjexport
figures are represented as one. tnfortunately they
cannot be separated although individual statistics are
in preparation.
Recent data from the Economist Intelligence unit show
that South Africa is the main supplier of imports to
Botswana (82 per cent), Lesotho (83 per cent), Malawi
(48 per cent), Mozambique (27 per cent), Namibi~ (87
per cent), Swaziland (47 per cent), Zambia (27 per
cent) and Zimbabwe (33 per cent). It is also the main
customer for the exports of Lesotho (46' pe.r cent) I
Swaziland (47 per cent) and Zimbabwe (17 per cent),
but the second largest customer for Mozambique (17 per
cent) •
If South Africa's evident interest in increasing its
sales to the region were to be accommodated through an
indiscriminate opening of the re~ional markets,
several adverse consequences could follow:
existing imbalances could worsen;
industrial development in the region be impeded;
t~ade between existing SADC member states
swamped.
Any further opening up of the region to South African
commodi ties would have to proceed on the basis of
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specific negotiat.ed trade agreements. The current
negotiations for a regional trade protocol are a
positive sLjn, The protocol must take account of the
need to protect local Lndust.rLes and allow trade
between the SADC countries to increase. In other
words as Thabo Mbeki, South African Deputy President
put it:
expanding and sustaining economic
int~gration in Southern Africa would
have to be based on a more eguitable
two-way flow of capit.al, goods and
services between South Africa and the
rest of the :region.(8)
In this sense, industry, investment and tariff
barriGrs become crucial elements for two-way co-
operation to happen.
The existing level of economic production gives rise
to incompatible export and import products. (9)
Successful industrial co-operation demands a sustained
growth in the consumption of regional products. The
current hindrance in rapidly extending intra-regional
trade is that these economies expor-t."mostly mineral
and agricultural products.
The export-import structure of the SADC rp.gion
predomi~antly reflects the international division of
labour. The SADC states, as underdeveloped countries
are exporters of p~imary commodities (Table 5.3) and
importe~~ of a variety of industrial products,
particularly intermediate and capital goods, depending
on the degree of import sUbstitution which has taken
place in each state.
SITe Oescri ption Percentage of total exports
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TABLE 5.3: EXPOR'r STRUCl'!lRE III 1984 ~ PROOuc.r GROllPS AT THE srrc TII.REE DIGIT LEVEL
(by value in ;ercentaqe of total expclrts)
Angola 331 Crude petroleum etc. 76.2~~, Coffee 3.5",'i.l
m Petroleum prod~cts 4.7
Botswana Diamonds 74•4
Copper 8.4
Malawi 121 Tobacco, ullmanufactured 48.1
061 Sugar and honey 8.~
074 Tea and mate 23.S
MozaJlbique 061 sugar and honey 7.7
031 Fish fresh, simply preserved 36.0
074 Tea and mate 7.4
051 Fruit fresh, nuts fresh, dry 19.4
Swaziland sugar 38.6
Wuud pulp 21.4
Tanzania 071 Coffee 39.1
263 cotton 10.6
275 Spices 6.4
ZaJibia 682 Copper 87.7
Zillbabwe 121 Tobacco I ul1l'lanufactured 22.9
671 Pi~ iron, etc. 12.1
263 cotton 9.5
."
Source: KISAHGA,E.S. Industrialisation and Trade cO-OReration in Eastern and Southern Africa, Averbury, England,
1991, p.145.
In support of this remark, is the fact that SADC
members lack an industrial base, which could serve to
build national productive capacities which would
enable them to increase levels of commodity trade
across their national boundaries.(W)
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This conclusion followed the SADC's stated principles
that the building of national productive capacities
must be given first priority, to a+cai.nhigh levels of
commodity trade across their boundaries.
Through industrialisation, the SADC states would not
only end their current need ,to import finished
manufactured products from the OECD as well as South
Africa/ but they would also become competitive
themselves. Unless this happens, trade will continue
to be an obstacle to the creation of an integrated
southern African economy able to compete with other
economic blocs in the world.
Industrialisation is necessary for increased intra-
regional trade, in order to stimulate interest in the
products of the SADC states. Table 5.4, shows the
contribution of the manufacturing sector Ln percentage
and vu Lue terms to GOP in each SADC country; the
imbalance between South Africa and the rest of the
region.
TABLE 5.4: DATA ON THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR
COUNTRY YEAR ~ OF GDP $MN0
Angola 1.993 1.9 117
Botswana 1992/93 4.5 153
Lesotho 1992 15.8 89
Ualawi 1993 11.8 238
Mozambique 1993 15.1(<1) 312(;')
Namibia 1993 9.3 195
Swaziland 1991/92 39.1 337
Tanzania 1992 4.6 107
Zambia 1993 28.6 910
LZimbabwe 1993 21.6 1123
k South Africa 1993 24.1 28261-
Source:
(a) Figures reflect "gross out.put; by orig:i.n"I
not GDP, and relate to "industry and
fishing". GDP data do not exist. 'llhese
figures sbour," be treated with extreme
caution.
£;ponomist Intelliqence Unit.
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c. Investments
It se~ms policy measures directed at increasing trade
must also aim at increaslng investments to diversify
the economies of the region. A country like Tanzania
whose "economy Ls roughly tt~1(mty-five times smaller
than South Africa'sll(l.2) would not benefit from a purely
trade-based relationship. Unless there is real
Lnvestmerrt in production and infrastructure I reI ~tion8
between South Africa and the other SADCcount.r ies w ;
~imply replicate those of the region's relations wi~h
the North.
The promotion of investments in the region will
require IIclear industrial strategies, investment
codes, currency convert:ibili ty and a regulatory
framework which enhances economic stability,
predictabili ty and transparencyll. (13) Anothar element
in an attempt to increase investment. will be 1:t.')
promote the partlcipatloc of the private sectors f.n
the sub-regional integration process.
d. Monetary relations
To facilitate intra-SADC trade and investment and to
pave the way fol.' the eventual economic union p an
efficient and effective payments mechanism is
essential. Mone·tary CO-l. r erat.Lon all\Ollg the SADe
countries is presently quite ,limited.
There are, in the region as a whole, divers~ and non-
convertible currency systems I which.have rendered both
intl'a-regional trade and cross bord~r investments
difficul t to implement.. Early in the integration
process I efforts should be made to overcome this
problem, through effective payment and clearing
arrangements and in~ra-regional currency
conver-t i.bdLdty. Although a move t()wards greater
cu~rency convertibility is underway in most countries
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outside of the regi.onll• (15) To
markets for beef in Angola
previously were supplied by
illustrate this point,
and Mozambique which
fellow SADC members
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of the region, problems created by 00ntinued lack of
convertibility cons'tLtnrcea serious immediate ba:crier
to increasing intra-regional trade.
e. Tariff and llOL ,·tariffbarrif?_~s
Notwi thstanding the argument that "tariffs do not
constitute the major barriers to intra-regional
trade,,(14)I there is a need ·tohar ron.i ae tariff regimes
and to proceed to the elimination of tariff Juties if
an integrated market is to be created.
Basically there are two approaches to internatio~al
trade liberalisation: the international approach and
the regional approach. The Lntiez'natrl.ona L approach
involves international confe-rences under the aegis of
GATT, such as the Kennedy Round and the Tokyo Round
and the most recent Uruguay Round. The purpose of
these i~ternational conferences is to r~duce tariff
and ncn+La rLff barriers to Lrrcez-nat.Lonaf trade
worldwide.
In the ca.se c f the SADC economies, "trade
liberalisat.ion vi.e-e-v ie the outside world has
contribute.d to the stagnation of intra-regional trade r
opening up the SADC market, to cheap suppliers from
Botswa.na and Zimbabwe, are 'lOW in the hands of EU
producers which, due to the high degree of
agricultural subsidisation within the EU Common
Agricultural PoliC;y (c ...1:», are able to undercut the
regional suppliers.
~)
The regional approach involves agreements among small
numbers of nations 'Nl:.osepurpose is to establis:l free
trade among themselves while mai.ntaining barriers to
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trade with the rest of the world.
'l'herefoI ..•~, the need for a strong I cohesive regional
bloc in soucaern Africa is required to protect the
regional market against 'che effects of the
liberalisation of world markets. This requires a
common trade regime and a competitive regional
economy. There is some diversity in the tariff
regimes in force in the SADCcountriea. Five of the
twel ve SADCmember states are members of the SACU.
These five countries - Botiswana, Lesotho, swazi.Lend ,
Namibia and South hf' a - are bound by the SACU
agreement to allmv aacn other complete duty free
access to their domestic markets.
Nine of the twelve SADCmembers are also members of
COMESA. 1J.1h13COMESAtreaty commits members to the
gt'adual reduction and eventual elimination· of customs
duties and non-tariff barriers to trade conducted
among themselves on goods on a commonlist, which
satisfy the COMESA'sRules of Origin. Apart from
trade covered by the SACUand COMESAprovisions,
there are also a number of bilateral trade agreemen.ts
involving tariff reductions or removals, which have
haem entered into by various SADCmember states with
each ochez and with third parties. A h.armonisation of
tariff regimes is needed in southern Africa.
Another problem which needs to be looked at is the
elimination of tariff duties I implying a removal of
sc rch African tariff and non-tal'iff barriers to
imports from its neighbours. In fact I •just as South
Africa needs open access to neighbouring markets if
its development is to be based em expoz+-Led
manufacturing industries, so, Loo, do south Africa's
neighbours need free accesa to i tt:~marketis,
..
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At present, the South African market; is a protect.ed
one. The implications of a protected market are
i:mport corrtrors and high tariffs. In the South
African context ·these measures have been implemented
partially to address the country's halance-of-payments
problems and partly to protect South African
industries against foreign competition .
.\. South Africa that is looking outward by liberalisin9
its import regime, one that is managing its, foreign
exchange r~te and productiviL! in its domestic
industries in ways that permit a flow of growing
imports as it exports to the region, could be of
enor.mous importance to the countries in the area. But;
research undertaken by the African Development Bank
(ADB) and .South Africa Foundation for Economic
Research (SAFER), and Cross-Border Initiative (CBI)
report, show that non-tariff barriers (NTBs) WE~rea
more important constraint on intra-regional trade than
were tariffs.
These NTBsinclude: quotas and import licensing, the
constraint ability to pay, high cost production,
attitude of consumer, political factors, tied aid,
lack of information and marketing, a neglect of th.e
private sector's rule, a lack. of political will to
implement resolutions, corz-upt.Lon and a lack of
complementari ty in production. It is must be said
that some of these NTBsare no longer as important as
they were a der;ade ago. For example, political fac-
tors, \'Jith the changes which have occurred in South
Africa and Hozambique, are. no longer really
significant. In Zambia, the Open General Import
Licensing (OGIL) system was abandoned in 1993, and the
exchange control act was replaced in 1994; most goods
can now be freely imJ;)rted.
considerable
immediately
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f. Labour migrants
It is also necessary for the labour issue to be taken
as part and parcel of regional relations in areas such
as investment and trade, to ensure a linkage between
capital and labour flows1 on the one hand, and trade
in goods and services, on t.he other.
The issue of labour is bound to be one of the
important subjects of. negotiation, giverr the long
history of both skilled and unskilled labour migration
and the diversity of real or potential economic
capacities in the region. (16) No Lssue more clearly
iLLustrates the pattern of regional dependence and the
dilemma in which the new government in South Africa
finds itself than that. of migrant ·labour.
Thl~implication of labour migrancy for all. the issues
of deepening co=oper'at.Lon is the South African fear
that SADCmembershipmay lead to increased migration.
Thl9terms of co-operation must be defined: A free
tr.1de association or a commonmarket. Free trade
as soci.at.Lon as opposed to a commonmarket does not
co 1tain the right of migration. Actually, any new
appr-oachto this problem will have to be based on the
reoognition of the fact that:
Supplier
economic
states cannot Nithout
and social disruption
withdraw from the migrant labour system. (17)
The adoption of a nationalistic regional economic
policYJ as is apparent by the increase of
xenophobia in South Africa, will have
consequences for both South Africa and its
neighbours. For South Africa 1 any economic
crisis in the neighbol.lring states will sp.i11 over
into South Africa through border crises, increase
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in immigration, loss of market for its goods.
For the other SADe states adverse consequences
will be the loss of revenue through remittances
and loss of skilled labour.
Influx controls do not work, whether they are
implemented internally by an apartheid government.
or externally by national states trying to keep
work seekers out. (16) The South African government
is misled in believing that people from
neighbouring countries can be dissuaded or
prevel1ted from emigrating to South Africa" The
case of the United states and Mexico is
instructi ve of another possible unintended
consequence of nationalistic labour and economic
policies. The huge number of i11egals who risk
life and limb to go to the united States for jobs
shows the power of poverty and the lure of rich
neighbours.
It is r therefore r in South Africa's interest to be
surrounded by states that are well disposed,
prosperous and economically and politically stable.
Any new co-operative approach to this challenge would
have to involve both a short-term and long-term
programme of reconstruction. In the long-term this
solution will be more humane and effective.
Illegal migration is best contain.ed by increasing
economic opportunities in the !lsending" countries.
Not onlv 10 those opportunities give employment to
people wkhch enables them to stay home, but they also
put, sufficient money in their pockets to enabie them
to buy South African products.
since South Afrir,a cannot stop the influx of refugees
and jJ 1-::galmigrants into the countrry from the rest of
the region, her Reconstruction and Development will
II,.;
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have to include the neighbours in order to motivate
them to remain in their respective states. This
places a great burden on the South African government,
but it seems to be a burden which it is destined to
carry for a number of years ahead.
g. community-buildi.ng
Regional co-operation and integration in Africa
remains essentially a function of political
intercourse among heads of states, buz-eaucr'atis and
secretariat officials. In many countries the Ldea of
forming or joining an economic co-operation
arrangement springs less from the wishes of the peop'l,e
in response to their felt needs than from the
leadership.
An oubacandtnq case is the SADC treaty. r.twould have
been uuch to the 0:t'edit of the SADCC/SAOC if the
document had been publicised in all member states
~rior to its ratification. This would have shown the
political significance of the event.
Any economic organisation must begin with the people,
from the gre.ss-roots to the heads of states. Jet is
not worth the effort for heads ,of states and
government or ministers to sign protocol on free 'trade
if the manufacturers, traders, bankers, financiers,
and the clearing agem::s who are actual practitioners
of trade, are not involved. The SADC needs to develop
a community-building strategy: involving the people
in the var ious areas of regional co-operation. ':£Ihe
involvement of the people is needed for public
mobilisation, and dissemination of the objectives and
strategies f'oz'the building of a Southern African
Development Community.
I
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The SADC faces an uphill task in inspiring all
elements of society in member states to support both
ideas of regional integration. Regional integration
remains the concern of a small technocratic elite in
the government of member states. More needs to be
done to develop wider private and political
constituencies for integration in the southern African
region and to mobilize the region's own resources for
development to achieve the goal of regional
sovereignty and self-reliance.
The SADC integration process should be based on the
twin pillars of real commitment by governments, and
the effective participation by a popular constituency
in formulating as well as executing a regional
programme. To achieve this end, it is desirable that
the new SADC Treaty should provide an institution
forum for some kind of directly elected SADC regional
parliament.
particular
A parliamentary body wouLd 'serve as a
driving force for the unification of
Southern Africa.
This chapter has examined the three scenarios for
integration open to southern Africa. ;Phe traditional
scenario of trade liberalisation has been said to be
inappropriate for developing countries in general and
southern Africa in particular. The project co-operation
scenario followed by the SADCC since its creation in 1980
has ceased to be relevant. It appears that although the
SADCC has avoided the development of powerful supra-
.~
I ,
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national institutions, the relations between industrial and
trade co-operation and the attendant demands that it is
putting to the region need a strong central institution.
The predominant.ly national institutions with greater power
will have to give way to operational co-ordination
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development if the objectives of industrial and trade co-
operation, are to be ::ealised. But this condition would be
met within a development integration perspecti ve which
requires moving further in the direction of multi-sectoral
co-ordination, to address such issues as the setting of
tariffs, allocation of industries and investments.
The argument is made that the labour migrant problem will
have to be addressed in the regional context; any
nationalistic perspective will only exacerbate it. The
chapter also argues that the success of the SADC is
strictly linked to the Lnvotvemen+ of the population and
the accountability of regional governments. 'rhe next
chapter will conclude th~'entire thesis.
~-\
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CHAPTER VI
CONCJ ...pSr.O:tI.
This study has argued that the process of dismantling
apartheid in South Africa which started on 2 February 19901
has provided a climate conducive to closer economic co-
operation and integration in southern Africa. But this
move requires co-ordinated actions at a number of levels
and its possible success rests on the ability of the SADe
to resolve the issues of regional institutions, .equity,
compensation and balanced development, which ar e' at the
root of any regional integration scheme involving countries
with unequally developed economies.
The basic questions focus~d on in the study are: firstly,
to what extent the transition period in South Africa, from
2 February 1990 onwards, provjdes the SADC with the
political and economic climate to implement. the changes
needed to promote co-operation/integration? Secondly,
what stands in the way of promoting this re-jlonal co-
operation desp!te the declared intention by both South
Afrlca and the other SADC states? Thirdly. what are the
possibilities of overcoming these obstacles?
The end of apartheid and the introduction of political
reforms in South Africa affc . the countries !)fthe
region the opportunity to decrease the intensity of
regional conflicts. The past situation in the
southern African region wa~ characterised by prolonged
liberation wars (Angol~ and Mozambique), South
Africa's policy of destabilisation, the superpowers I
In this chapter conclusions from the analysis of these
three questions will be presented.
a. The end of Apartheid and the political reforms in
South Africa: implications for:the SADe
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intervention (Cold War); it was marked by diverse
economic policies amongst states. This environment
led to confrontationist policies, _. )lation of South
Afric':and low level of economic interdependence among
regional states. The SADCC which came into existence
in 1980 with the "Luaaka Declaration" has as one of
its main objectives the reduction of economi~
dependence, particularly, but not only; on the
Republic 0.. South Africa. This objective was not
surprising ~iven South Africa's ecanomic and military
i.nflnence. Regional economic dependence on South
Africa was and still is very extensive I involving
trade imbalances in favour of SO'LIthAfrica I domd.nat.Lor;
by souch Africa's multinationals of the mining and
industrial development in the region; migrant labour
dependency and abpve all transport dependency.
The region's hostility t.o South Afri9?-, however,
stemmed from South Afric.'1'saparche.,. pl:tl.l.!ticesthat
oppressed that country's Black population. It fJJasthe
abhorrence of apartheid that became the unifying
factor for the SADCC. Because of the economic 5nter-
linkages with South Africa no common trade stand was
developed against South Africa within the SADCC. The
. .Ly eLement; thdt came under discussion was the
establishment of alternative ,transport and
communication routes to South Africa.
But the situation has changed. South Africa is now a
democratic country.
It is clear that one immediate and important benefit
arising from the process of democratisation in South
Africa was an end to Pretoria I s policy of region.al
destabilisation, wh: ~ has been of enormous economic
oost to the front ..ine states. The process of
dismantling apartheid meant that the SADCC also had to
1
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reassess its ( :t;,ives if it was to oorrt.Lnue to
this assessment that led to thefur.etion.
formatio:..~of the SADCwith the WindhoekDeclaration in
1992.
This thesj s has argued tha·t economic developmen·t in
southern Africa and political reform in South Africa
are interlinked.
with the end
The end of apartheid which coinc+des
of South Africa's policy of
destabilisation is an important stage at which to
begin addressing regional developmental problems. The
new political dispensation in South Africa makes ·the
entire r~gion look forward to peace dividends
follmoJing South Africa 1s ne,,? regional economic
polic1es, and for their positive effect on southern
Africa. South Africa has joined the SADCas the
eleventh member and has promised t.::>pursue regional
economic. relations based on eg1..lality and mutual
benefit.s.
The argument has also been put; foward that tihe new
South Africa is faced with two options in so far as
its regional policy is concerned. One..,f these is the
adoption of a passive and inward-looking regional
policy under which it continues to benefit from the
existing and newly created flows of surprus value
(which are, in turn, a result of the dominance-
dependence relations that have cl..aracterised the
region for a long time). Whilst it mal look
attractive, such a policy ~.s quite :t'.. sky for South
Africa. Not only would it deepen the existing
d .dnance-dependence relations (and thereby generate
tension and resentment in the region), but it would
alfio heighten the possibi~ity of new political
struggles gean'!d to ...."eversing whatever progress has
been achieved internally. Thus, the short term net
gains are likely to be offset by long-term net losses.
I
I
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The conclusion is that a passive, inward-looking
l'egional policy for 8",uth 11frica (or for any other
count.ry in southern A.frica for that matter) should not
be preferred over t ,;alternative.
The alb:,rnative is for south Africa to adopt an
active, multilateral, outward-looking
accommodative approach to regional issues.
and
This
errceiLs a conscious effort to enhance national and
regional security on the one hand, and genuinE!,
egtd tablloaand mutually beneficial economic relations
on the o·ther. Access to national markeris must be
reciprocal, multilaterally negotiated and must contain
an element of compensation which results in all
parties be:l.ng better off. I'he South African
governmen'chas opted for this choice. But it is :not
an easy choice for South Africa to defend politically
to its domesti.c constituency. The process of change
in South Africa is being driven largely by che force
of unmet expectations on the part of those currently
disenfranchised.
opportunities for regional integration are in
principle to be found within the framework of the
southern African DaveLopment;Community(SADe). t.i'he
experience am) the result of the co-operation in the
context of ~!eSADe,particularly the fostering of a
regional identity and commonbelonging have provided
a basis for economic integra~ion. Memberstates have
acquired eXl"I1riencein working together effectively,
par-ticularly in such areas as transp?rt and
communicati...l1
enti:lrgy.
agricultural research, security and.
J
J Therefore, given South Africa's rel:ltive st:r:ength inmany fields, it will significantly contribute to a
reshaping of the SADe towards a higher degree of
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economic integration, which is already on the SADe
policy agenda. The membershipof the democratic South
Africa into the SADehas given a majo.r boos·t to
efforts already underway to promote regional co-
operation and integration in southern Africa.
Another inportant factor which will favour co-
operation in the post-apartheid era is the existence
of interdependent economies in the region. The
southern African political economyhas potentialities
for increased interdependence. The entry of South
Africa in to the SADCcoucd greatly enlarge the
overall size of the regional market and create new
opportunities for co-operation in many fields.
There is a strong consensus in southern Africa that
~egional co-operation is a powerful means to promote
economic development, poli tical stabi.] i ty and
security. Through past co-operation in a number af
areas, particularly transport, water, energy and
labour migration, southern African countries have
started to capitalise on their interdependence and are
in the process of developing a vision of the mutual
benefits of closer economic co-operation, particularly
through the SADC. ':['heSADC'schances for success \\1ill
requhl} countries of the region to take . wider
political and economic perspective, engage in regional
policy thinJeing, and ir.crease coherence in decision-
making process.
~)
The success of efforts by the regional states towards
co-oper'at.Lonwill also depend t.o a large extent on the
readiness ot South Africa to recognise the long-term
importance of building a strong regional dimension
into its political and economic orientation. The
South African government has to consider the benefits
to be reaped from heal thy 1 growing neighbours whohave
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much to offer in return for the advantages sout.h
Africa can contribute to the region. Policies,
strategies and programmes of economic development
should be restructured in such a way that all the
countries of the region have a fair share of
opportunit.ies for investment, production, trade, and
employment creation.
In view of regional and international hopes that south
Africa will help to promote the material well~being of
its neighbours, it will be in the interest bf south
Africa to demonstrate a firm commitment to mutually
beneficial regional co-operation in order to encourage
external support for its domestic reconstruction and
development efforts. The smallness of the SADe
countries' economies and the low income levels, make
it difficult for them individually to attract and
sustain the necessary investment for de~~lopment and
grm·lth. Thus oconomi,c restructuring ut hltjller levels
of efficiency and productivity will constitute an
important ground for economic integration in south
Africa.
b. Challenges facing the SADe to increase economic co-
opslr.'ation.
The first challenge for economic coo-operation and
integration in southern Africa is the building of a
new relationship which includes a democratic I non-
racial south Africa bas~d on realistic assessments of
capacities and intorests of all co-operating partners.
The notion that South Africa will be the salvation of
the region will need to be examined in the ~ontext of
the per roriaance of its economy. The state of the
South African economy and the imperative need for the
new government to address the issue of poverty amongst
il
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the majority of its people complicate the idea of
establishing a relationship based on expectations of
large net outflows of funds from South Africa to the
rest of the region. There is no practical possibility
of South Africa emerging either as an aid donor' or
even as a major source of capital investment for the
region. There is a need for conscious co-ordination
and intervention by all regional partners, for
correcti ve ",;('lasu):'esto meet the particular needs of
each of them.
The political dispensation and economic realities of
the immediate post-apartheid period in South Africa
may impose constraints, not only on policies designed
to address the domestic socio-economic reconstruction
agenda I but also on the country.'s meaningful
participation in the restructuring of th.e regional
relations on equitable basis.
Besides these organisational challenges, the
developmental and structural economic featur.es;
poverty, lack of Lnduacr ies , low intra-regional
trade I infrastructure problems I regional debt., wi11
also have a direct bearing on the prospect.s for
economic recovery and the possibility of economic co-
operation/integration in the region., It would be a
mistake to ignore the developmental problems and
suggest that they would be automatically solved by the
promotion of economic growth through trade and
investment alone.
'Jlheprecise con'~ent of a programme aimed at promoting
greater regional economd.c co-operation, co-orddna'cdon
and l.ntegration needs to be shaped by the concrnce
realities prevailing in the region. The countries of
southern Afric&; are low to lower middle income
economies I producing primary products for export to
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the industrialised countries of the North. This has
proved to be a weak basis for real development
Lnvolving structural transformation of their
economies, leading to increased investment and the
competi tisre production of a variety of goods and
services.
The economic weakness and stagnancy of all southern
African economies are a major obstacle to integrat~on
because of their negative impact on government
policies. The disappointing result of attempts at
regional economi.c integration oan be explained as the
failure by governments to understand adequately the
nature of development problems :facingthe SADe states I
and hence the subsequent choice of unsuitable deve-
lopment strategies for these countries. Under these
conditions the forces of regional cohesion could
weaken.
The economic interdependence in southern Africa,
mentioned previously, has not yet been exploited by
the BADe countries. Besides, the performance of
economies in the region is diverse t resulting in a
lack of macro-econl~ic policy convergence. This has
created a variety of non-market-based exchange rates,
thereby distorting trade relationship~. As a result,
intra-regional trade has been negatively affected.
Two other sets of challenges id/.:mtifiedare those
linked to the SADe's past which includes the loose
organisational arrangement , involving the operation
and poor states of economies of member states I and
those linked to the changed regional and global
political and economic situation.
The main obstacles to co-operation and integration
within the SADe that stem from its past are: the
..
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absence of firm institutional mechanisms to promote
co-operation, the sectoral co-operation and project
approach that g~nerates competition rather than co-
operation I and the existence of multiple economic
organisations all seeking to promote regional economic
co-operation and integration.
The first element 'tolhichwill bear heavily on the
implementati~n of policies to increase co-operation,
is the foreign aid factor. At least part of the
external aid channelled to the SADCC and its:members
in the past was moti vated by anti -aparthei.d
sentiments. 'l'hiswas justified in terms of support. 19
the countries of the region in the face of South
Africa's destabilisation and military aggression.
The end of apartheid and the collapse of communism in
Eastern Europe, suggest that donor courrcr i.as may
~onr.entrate their attention on the economic and
political stabilisation of Eastern Europe and this
will be done to the detriment of aid and investment
financ~ for souther-onAfrica. This could have a
negative impact on the efforts to increase economic
co-operation in southern Africa. But other emerging
situations in the region can counteract this slow flow
of aid in southern Africa. Freed from the conditions
of apartheid and violence, southern Africa might
projoct itself as a politically and socially stable
zone. This factor, allied to rich mineral r~sources
that Gontinue to be worthy of attention, mean that the
region may remain a acne of economic interest to the
North, particularly with resp~ct to aid investment
flows.
If the new South African government of :nati.onalunity
il1itiates the necessary :reforms w.1. thin the context of
credible and market-orientated policies as a response
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to GATTglobalisation of world economy, South Africa
will offer good opportunities for more intensive
international economic co-operation in the region. In
the course of its political stabilisation and its
reintegration into the world mark +:9 South Africa
could, because of its well-developed infrastructure
both in finance, and transport Q communication and
its technological capabilities, ~erve multinational
enterprises as a "bridgehead" to southern Africa.
Aleo, the much heralded possibilities of a strong
regional economic grouping based on equalitYI as
opposed to fragmented, nationally-bound markets, will
attract much attention, due to the economies of scale
and its consequent attractj' ~s for capital
investors.
Trading and production integration blocs are being
formed internationally. This is a .. threatening
situation as the blocs in the emerging triangle (North
American Free Trade, European Uni011, Pacific Rim) work
towards becoming more self-sufficient and increasingly
inward-looking. The uncertainty surrounding the
successful implementation of the World Trade
organisation (WTO) is specially worrying. The
negotiating power that the triangle wields is enormous
and priori ti.es are focused on immediate internal needs
before assisting those outside of the bloc. Southern
Africa is rapidly reaching the point where it is no
longer a prior:.L"t.yin the eyes of the global deve-
lopment assistance community and any development and
growth must primarily come from within the region.
Southern Africa muc; , th' ..:I':''-:'f)l·..."f strerigthen itself.
economically and politically if it is to become a
serious player in international ?,Yati)ns.
r.rhe difficu] ~cies evident in past attempts at
integrating the region's economies are to be taken
176
into account not only by the regional players I but
al;:, ) by the international actors involved in assisting
the region in pursuing its objectives. As concerns
the ED, in particular I it faces the challenge of
elaborating a viable co-operation formula for Southern
Africa, one which incorporates ED, South Africa and
southern Africa's policies.
This will obviously raise questions with respect to
the existing economic formations in the region,
particularly the respective future roles of the SADC,
COMESAand SACU. In addition to this, there are
several bilateral agreements between various member
states. The urgent need to rationalise the activities
of all these is obvious! if conflict and wasteful
duplication are to be avoided.
c. SADCproject for regional co-operation anq,development
In manyways, the functional IIquestion is not whether
some form of integration will be attempted in southern
Africa, but rat',her what terms and principles wi11
govern a project of regional economic co-operation in
the r gion and to what extent the governments and
peoples of t.he BADe region take thl:i' ini tiati ve in
shaping it".(l)
The traditional process of economic integration:
·t.rade area, customs union I economic community
common market t has been rejected as a model
free
and
for
economic integration in southern Africa. It has
repeatedly been said that static customs unions
analysis based mainly on European experience is not
relevant in the vastly different situation of the
developing economies of Southern .i\fl'ica.
j
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Economic integration would only take off in southern
Africa if the SADC seeks the co-ordinated development
of neW me~hods. The hypothesis here is that at the
present stage of development, the SADe should
concentrate on a development integration approach
which provides for continuing with the functional co-
operation of the last sixteen years, to address many
of the production infrastructure and efficiency
barriers, deriving from underdevelopment. In
addition, there will be an active 'trade market
integration component, aimed at creating a' unified
regional market, by reducing the barriers to trade in
goods and services, cross-border investment, the
eventual free movement of labour and the
Lmpf.emerrt.at.Lon of a central regional decision-making
body_
But this approach will only bear fruit if.~t has grass
roots support. The democratisation of SADC is indeed
important in the course of integrating the economies
of the region. Democratisation implies the empower-
ment of the broad majority of people who have been
left out of economic and social development and policy
decision-making. It will ensure that the process of
economic integration reflects and deals with problems
facing the southern African region.
'rheSADe needs to bring all sections of the region's
societies into the mainstream of regional co-operation
efforts. Reyional co-operation will remain a "paper
castle" until it touches the lives of the ordinary
citizens of the region, and until they can be involved
in determining its form and content.
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POSTSCRIPTS
At the time of sUbmission of this thesis events have
continued to confirm the determination of Sl>.DC member
states to r~ally start working together at pursuing
regional co-operation in Southern Africa.
After the adopt.Lon of the declaration and the treaty of
Southern African Development community (SADC) in August
1992 and the South African acces~ion to the SADCtreaty on
29 August 1994, SADCmemberrstates have this time 1 at their
annual conference which was 11eld in South Africa at Kempton
Park from signed a memorandumof understanding in respect
of the formation of the South€....n African Power Pool.
The purpose of this memorandum of understanding as
stipulated in its Article 1 is to establish a framework
under which the signatories pronounce their cl~C!.r intention
to enhance regional power 00- opezat.Lon through the
establishment and operation of the SouthBrn African Power
Pool.
The basis for this power pool is the need for all
participants:
(a) to co-ordinate and co=opez'atie in t.1;19 planr.ing and
operation of their systems to minimise costs while
maintaining reliability I ,:'utonomyand self-sufficiency
to the degree they desire; and
(b) to fully recover their.' costs and share equitably in
the resulting benefits, including .reductions in
required generating capacity, reductions in fuel costs
and improved use of hydro-electric energy.
At. the same occasion, Mauritius acceded to SADetreaty as
the twelfth member.
~I ,
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